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The importance of outlook toward the future is 
acknowledged . by many theories of depression, and there is a 
large body of research demonstrating that depressed 
individuals have a negative future outlook. However, no 
study was found which compared depressives* future outlook 
with their perception of the present. This study was 
intended to make such a comparison. A Dysphoric or Elated 
m o o d  wa s  i n d u c e d  in e a c h  of 98 s u b j e c t s  by a p r o c e d u r e  
involving autobiographical memories. Subjects were then 
a s k e d  to i m a g i n e  a sc e n e  one year in the future, and to m a k e  
comparisons with the scene used to induce the Elated or 
Dysphoric mood. Comparisons were made for three Change- 
Factors (uniqueness, change, and improvement) across four 
categories (image as a whole, emotions, behaviors, and 
cognitions). It was predicted that in all categories Elated 
subjects would rate more uniqueness, change, and improvement 
than Dysphoric subjects. Analysis of the data was 
complicated by the fact that 16 of the Dysphoric subjects 
spontaneously raised their mood to levels comparable to the 
Elated subjects while imagining the future. In general, the 
hypotheses that Elated subjects would rate more uniqueness, 
change, and improvement than Dysphoric subjects received 
little or no support, with only one comparison attaining 
statistical significance. Relationships among the data 
remained essentially unchanged under transformation by image 
clarity and image intensity, and were not affected by social 
desirability. It was also predicted that Elated subjects 
would choose to imagine more distant future times than 
Dysphoric subjects if given a choice. This prediction was 
not supported. An unexpected interaction between sex of 
subjects and total score across all Change-Factors and 
Categories approached statisical significance. Female 
subjects appeared to rate future images differentily in 
different raood groups, while male subjects did not. It is 
proposed that future imagery may play an important role in 
modifying subjects' mood, and directions for future research 
are suggested. It is also proposed that the experimental 
hypotheses did not receive an adequate test due to 
methodological problems, and that further research is 
merited.
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
Feelings of sadness, pessimism, hopelessness, and a 
generally negative outlook toward the future are among the 
hallmarks of depression. The depressed individual may 
describe himself or herself as discouraged, down in the 
dumps, low, blue, and so on or may complain of "not caring 
anymore". People who are depressed seem unable to 
experience pleasure (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 
1980, p. 210.). Furthermore, they see the future as bleak 
and foreboding. Beck (1967) found that 78% of a sample of 
depressed patients endorsed an item indicating a pessimistic 
v i e w  of the future, as c o m p a r e d  w i t h  22% of a s a m p l e  of 
nondepressed patients. Pes s i m i s m  also had the highest 
correlation with overall level of depression of any of the 
items in the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, 1967). Other 
items which showed high correlations with depression 
included sadness, lack of satisfaction, and suicidal wishes.
The purpose of this study is to compare depressives' 
expectations of what the future will be like with their 
perceptions of the present, with the intention of showing 
that they do not e x p e c t  tha t t h e i r  f u t u r e  w i l l  be ver y m u c h  
different from their present. First, the importance of 
future outlook for various theories of depression will be 
briefly discussed. Next, the empirical evidence regarding 
depressives' views of the future will be reviewed. Finally,
1
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a study which uses induced moods as analogs of depression 
and elation to compare imagined futures with current 
perceptions will be described. (Since dysphoria is a major 
component of depression, I chose to use subjects in an ,
induced dysphoric mood rather than clinically depressed 
subjects for reasons of practicality and clarity. See the 
c o m m e n t s  on methodology on p. 25.)
Theoretical Importance of Future 
Outlook in Depression 
Depressives' expectations about the future play an 
important part in many theories of depression. Since the 
purpose of this review is to illustrate a possible 
relationship between depressed individuals' expectations 
about the future and their current perceptions, and since 
theoretical formulations of depression abound, a 
comprehensive review of the theoretical literature on 
depression will not be attempted. Rather, examples have 
been chosen because of their current importance in 
generating research on depression or because of their 
relevance to the current topic.
Cognitive Theories of Depression 
In recent years cognitive theories of depression have 
led to a great deal of research on how depressed individuals 
think. Beck's theory of depression and the reformulated 
learned helplessness theory of depression developed by 
Seligman and his colleagues are two of the most important
3
cognitive theories. Each will be discussed briefly, 
followed by discussion of a recent attempt to integrate 
current thinking on cognitive theories by using information 
processing theory.
Beck's Theory of Depression
According to Beck (1967) depression occurs when certain 
cognitive structures, or schema, are activated by the 
occurence of negative events. These schema cause the 
individual to view himself, the world, and the future in 
negative ways. Beck writes, "The progressive dominance of 
these cognitive patterns leads to the other phenomena that 
are associated with the depressive state" (1967, p. 255).
One characteristic of these schema is that they involve 
making certain logical errors, which Beck labels arbitrary 
inference, selective abstraction, and overgeneralization.
Of particular interest in this review is the concept of 
overgeneralization, which Beck defines as "the patients' 
pattern of drawing a general conclusion about their ability, 
t h e i r  p e r f o r m a n c e ,  or t h e i r  w o r t h  on the ba s i s  of a s i n g l e  
incident" (1967, pp. 234-235). While Beck's conception of 
overgeneralization seems to limit its application to present 
sitiuations (e.g. "I'm a poor father because the children 
aren't better disciplined," Beck, 1967, p. 235), it is easy 
to see that a n e g a t i v e  v i e w  of the fu t u r e  can be i n t e r p r e t e d  
as a sort of overgeneralization about the present (e.g. 
"Things feel awful now so things will always feel awful,").
4
Research described later in this review suggests that 
overgeneralizaton may be particularly characteristic of 
depressives’ thinking (Carver, Ganellen, & B e h a r - M i t r a n i , 
1985) .
Reformulated Learned Helplessness Theory
The reformulated learned helplessness theory of 
depression (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978) proposes 
that depression is related to the attributions that people 
make about the causes of bad events. According to the 
theory, depressed individuals attribute bad events to 
stable, internal, and global causes. This pattern of causal 
attribution leads the individual to anticipate that future 
outcomes are independent of their responses (Brewin, 1985). 
Variations of the theory hold that maki ng stable, global, 
and internal attributions about the causes of bad events can 
be a causal, symptomatic, or predisposing factor in 
depression (Brewin, 1985; Peterson & Seligman, 1984).
It is the attribution of bad events to stable causes 
that is of primary interest in this review. If a bad event 
is due to s o m e  s t a b l e  c a u s e  it is r e a s o n a b l e  for the 
depressed person to conclude that the bad event will reoccur 
or persist in the future. The future comes to be seen as 
resembling the present. It is also worth noting that the 
combination of global and stable attributional styles 
resembles B e c k ’s concept of over g e n e r a lization, that is the 
depressed person interprets bad events as indicating that a
ho s t  of s i m i l a r  bad e v e n t s  w i l l  occur b o t h  in the f u t u r e  and 
in other areas of his or her life.
Information Processing Theory
Ingram (1984) has recently proposed reevaluating 
various cognitive and behavioral theories of depression in 
terms of information processing theory. According to his 
analysis depression occurs when a negative event is 
appraised in such a way as to activate a particular network 
of affective and cognitive structures, referred to as a 
"depression node". Once activated, Ingram suggests that 
these cognitions and affects are continuously recycled, 
maintaining the depressive state. The continuous recycling 
of a p a r t i c u l a r  set of c o g n i t i o n s  and a f f e c t s  may lead the 
depressed person to process his imagined future in the same 
way the he processes the present. Indeed, it may be 
necessary for this type of processing to continue if 
depression is to exist. If imagined future events could be 
processed in a more positive, creative manner, the 
depression node might be broken. Different affects and 
cognitions might be activated and depression might cease. 
Ingram's theory seems to predict that depressed individuals 
will see the future as resembling the present by virtue of 
the existence of the depression node.
Behavioral and Motivational Theories of Depression 
Both Lazarus (1968) and Lewinsohn (1974) view 
d e p r e s s i o n  as r e s u l t i n g  f r o m  a loss of or lack of r e s p o n s e -
6
contingent positive reinforcement, which results in 
dysphoria. Cognitive sym p t o m s  are viewed as secondary to 
the dysphoric mood. Since these theories are couched in 
behavioral terms and give little heed to cognitions, the 
role of expectations might appear to be moot here. However, 
Lazarus (1972) and Lewinsohn (1974) acknowledge that 
anticipation of continuing lack of reinforcement seems to 
play a role in maintaining depression, if only through 
decreasing motivation to seek out more reinforcing 
situations or more social support. Indeed, Layne and his 
colleagues (Layne, 1980; Layne, Lefton, Walters, & Merry,
1983) view depression as being primarily a motivational  
deficit for positive outcomes. According to Layne, 
depressed individuals un derestimate both their ability to 
gain rewards and the value of the rewards available to them. 
They also overestimate the intensity and frequency of 
punishers. Layne stresses the role of future expectations 
in that he looks at the way depressed individuals evaluate 
the potential outcomes of their behaviors. Depressives 
evaluate the future as being aversive and unrewarding, and 
since depression is itself an aversive and unrewarding state 
we see that depressives* evaluations of the future resemble 
their evaluations of the present.
Another behavioral theory which also stresses the 
importance of cognitive phenomena is Rehm's (1977) self- 
control theory. Self-control is described as "those
7
processes by which an individual alters the probability of a 
response in the relative absence of external supports" (p. 
790). Self-control behaviors involve a feedback loop 
consisting of s e l f - m o n i t o r i n g , self-evaluation, and self­
reinforcement. Rehm lists six deficits in self-control 
behavior which are assumed to account for depression. Two 
of these, selective monitoring of negative events and 
selective monitoring of immediate as opposed to delayed 
consequences of behavior, are of interest here. Rehm states 
that negative expectations of the future result from 
selective monitoring of immediate negative consequences of 
behavior. Depressed individuals focus on negative events 
and immediate negative consequences to the point where they 
become unable to perceive a positive present or to imagine 
an improved, positive future. The future becomes an 
extension of the negatively perceived present.
Summary
Finally, as a closing c omment on theoretical issues, we 
note that even a major psychoanalytic writer (Bibring, 1953) 
makes reference to the importance of future outlook in 
depression. Ke writes that the basic mechanism in 
depression is "the ego's shocking awareness of its 
helplessness in regard to aspiraton" (p. 39). The depressed
individual feels powerless to obtain a desired state of 
affairs, and this sense of powerlessness exists both in the 
present and in the future.
8
From this brief, illustrative review we see that 
negative expectations of the future play a major and often 
central role in several important theories of depression.
We also note that there is a similarity or connection 
between the way depressed individuals process the present 
and the future. The word process may refer to a variety of 
activities, including monitoring of the self and negative 
events, making cognitive inferences about the causes of 
events or the extent to which the individual is responsible 
for them, experiencing changes in motivation related to 
perceived probability of positive and negative outcomes, and 
employing fixed cognitive-affective information processing 
structures. I think that the depressed individual's 
negative expectations are characterized by a lack of 
c r e a t i v e  s y n t h e s i s ,  w h i c h  is in s o m e  sense to say a lack of 
newness. Rather than imagining a new, improved future the 
depressed person sees the future as an extension of the 
tired, old, worn-out past. Other writers have made similar 
observations. For ex ample Beck (1967) describes a depressed 
person this way:
His anticipations of the future are generally an 
extension of what he views as his present state. If he 
regards himself as currently deprived, immobilized, or 
r e j e c t e d  he v i s u a l i z e s  a f u t u r e  in w h i c h  he is 
continually deprived, immobilized, or rejected. He 
seems unable to view his current state as having any
9
time limits or to consider the possibility of any 
improvement (pp. 259-260).
Empirical studies have addressed the way depressed 
individuals view the future using a number of strategies. 
These include analyzing depressives* cognitions, analyzing 
depressives* verbalizations and overt behavior, analyzing 
the relationship of hope and hopelessness to depression, and 
analyzing the amount of time to which depressives imagine 
the future to extend. These empirical studies will be 
reviewed below. However, no study was found which reported 
data on direct comparison between the way depressed 
individuals imagine the future and the way they perceive the 
present.^ It must be noted that the study to be described 
in following sections does not focus directly on depression 
either, but rather on dysphoria, which is a major and 
defining component of depression (APA, 1980; Lewinsohn &
Lee, 1981).
The Empirical Literature on Depression 
and Future Outlook 
Cognitive Theory-Based Research 
Cognitive theories of depression have generated a great
■'■For the purposes of this review, perception of the 
present refers to awareness of ongoing and recently 
completed events and behaviors. Similarly, imagining the 
future refers to awareness of potential or conceivable 
events and behaviors. It can be argued that percepts and 
images are in some sense indistinguishable (Sheikh, 1977). 
For our purposes the important distinction is between actual 
events (i.e. the present) and potential or conceivable 
e v e n t s  (i.e. the future).
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deal of research in recent years (Brewin, 1985; Coyne & 
Gotlib, 1983; Layne, 1983; Peterson & Seligman, 1984). This 
review will focus on two aspects of this research. First, a 
number of self-report instruments for assessing depressives' 
cognitions have been developed based on cognitive theories. 
These include the Cognitive Bias Questionnaire, the 
Attributional Style Questionnaire, and the Cognitions 
Questionnaire, all reviewed below. Although none of these 
instruments unambiguously compare the way depressed 
individuals imagine the future with the way they perceive 
the present, they do provide some suggestive findings. 
Second, there is a body of more general research arising 
from the cognitive literature on depression which also 
provides some hints about how depressives view the future, 
and these results will be summarized.
The Cognitive Bias Questionnaire
The Cognitive Bias Questionnaire (CBQ; H a m m e n  & Krantz, 
1976) was developed to look for the type of cognitive 
distortions that Beck's (1967) theory predicts (i.e. 
arbitrary inference, selective abstraction, and 
overgeneralization). It consists of six brief stories which 
present a character in a potentially problematic situation, 
each followed by several questions pertaining to the 
character’s thoughts and expectations. Each question has 
four possible responses, which the authors label depressed- 
distorted, depressed-nondistorted, n o n depressed-distorted,
11
and nondepressed-nondistorted. A typical story describes a 
young woman who lives in a dormitory and is all alone with 
no date on a Friday night. She overhears several other 
residents talking about going out for pizza, though she is 
not invited. Individuals taking the CBQ are asked to 
imagine themselves in her place as they answer questions 
about her thoughts. One item for the story just described 
begins "Being alone on a Friday night ...". The depressed- 
distorted response to this item is "upsets me and makes me 
start to imagine endless days and nights alone" (Hammen & 
Krantz, 1976, p. 580). Other responses are: "Doesn’t bother
me because I figure I'll have a date next weekend for sure" 
(nondepressed-distorted); "Doesn't bother me because one 
Friday night alone isn't that important; probably everyone 
has spent nights alone" (nondepressed-nondistorted); and 
"Upsets me and makes me feel lonely" (depressed- 
nondistorted). Note that an individual who chooses the 
depressed-distorted response indicates a belief that the 
future will continue to look just like the present.
A number of studies have found that depressed subjects 
endorse more depressed-distorted items on the CBQ (or 
closely related derivatives) than control subjects (Blaney, 
Behar, & Head, 1980; Haley, Fine, Marriage, Moretti, & 
Freeman, 1985; H a m m e n  & Krantz, 1976; Krantz & Hammen, 1979; 
Norman, Miller, & Klee, 1983). Not all of the items in the 
CBQ refer to future events, and none of these studies report
12
data which allow the contributions of future expectations to 
be extracted. Nevertheless, these results suggest that 
viewing the future as a relatively unchanging continuation 
of the p r e s e n t  m a y  play a part in c o g n i t i o n s  w h i c h  are 
c o m m o n  in depression.
The Attributional Style Questionnaire *
The Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ; Peterson, 
Semmel, von Baeyer, Abramson, Metalsky, & Seligman, 1982) 
was developed to assess causal attributions and 
attributional style in the fra m e w o r k  of the reformulated 
learned helplessness theory of depression (Abramson et al., 
1973). Subjects are directed to vividly imagine themselves 
in 12 hypothetical situations, half of which have a positive 
outcome and half of which have a negative outcome. They are 
then a s k e d  to w r i t e  d o w n  a m a j o r  c a u s e  of the o u t c o m e  and to 
rate the cause along the dimensions of internality, 
stability, and globality. (Subjects also rate the personal 
importance of such an event if it should happen to them.) 
Stability is rated by asking the subject to indicate on a 7- 
point scale whether, in the future, the cause will be "never 
again present" or "always present" (Peterson & Seligman, 
198A, p. 352), with the latter response indicating a stable 
attributional style. Note that the stable response implies 
that the future will continue to resemble the present. 
Studies have found significant associations between 
attributions of causal stability as measured by the ASQ (or
13
a childrens' variant) and depression in college populations 
(Peterson, Bettes, & Seligman, 1982; Seligman, Abramson, 
Semmel, & von Baeyer, 1979), children (Seligman, Peterson, 
Kaslow, Tanenbaum, Alloy, & Abramson, 198A), and depressed 
patients (Eaves & Rush, 198A; Raps, Peterson, Jonas, & 
Seligman, 1982). Even though some studies have 
failed to find significant correlations between stable 
causal attributions and depression (e.g. Navarra, 1981; 
Persons & Rao, 1981), and even though the relationship of 
causal attribution to depression remains an area of 
controversy (Brewin, 1985; Coyne & Gotlib, 1983; Layne,
1983; Peterson & Seligman, 198A), I believe that 
depressives* attributions are stable at least to the extent 
that they anticipate that the future will continue to 
resemble the present.
In this r e v i e w  it is p r o p o s e d  that it is not s i m p l y  the 
deperessed individual's attributions of cause which are 
stable, but rather that his whole conception of the future 
is an unchanging extension of the present. The ASQ fails to 
adequately assess the depressed individual's conception of 
the future in that it looks at attributions for specific 
hypothetical cases which may not be relevant to the 
individual. Situational factors may affect attributions 
about the causes of specific events while leaving the 
overall outlook toward the future unchanged.
The Cognitions Questionnaire
14
The Cognitons Questionnaire (CQ; Fennell & Campbell,
1984) was developed to assess the overall degree of 
cognitive distortion and emotional impact in response to 
positive, neutral, and negative events and to look at 
certain specific cognitive distortions. These specific 
cognitive distortions are the attribution of causality, 
generalization across time, generalization across events, 
and perceived uncontrollability. Fennell and Campbell point 
out that these attributions are made for the consequences 
rather than the causes of events. Subjects are asked to 
imagine themselves in eight hypothetical situations, and 
then to complete five multiple choice questions for each 
scenario. The questions address the emotional impact and 
the previously listed cognitive distortions. Two of the 
scenarios are of positive events, two are of neutral events, 
and four are of negative events. Fennell and Campbell found 
that overall CQ score correlated strongly with depression, 
and that depressed subjects showed significant differences 
from nondepressed subjects on all four of the cognitive 
distortion measures. Of particular interest here is that 
depressed subjects tended to overgeneralize across time.
That is, especially for negative events, they expected 
negative consequences to continue in a similar or identical 
fashion in the future.
Other Cognitive Research
Two other aspects of cognitive theory-based research
15
are of interest. The first area is research on depression, 
control, and self-blame, and the second area is further 
research on depression and overgeneralizaton.
Controllability and Self-Blame. Janoff-Bulman (1979) 
has argued that attributional theories of depression such as 
the reformulated learned helplessness theory (Abramson et 
al., 1978) overlook an important dimension of causal 
attributon; namely controllability. She notes that self­
blame is a major characteristic of depression and she uses 
the dimension of controllability to distinguish between two 
types of self-blame. Behavioral self-blame involves self- 
criticism of something that is under the individual's 
control; that is their own behavior. Characterological 
self-blame involves self-criticism of something not 
generally seen to be under the individual's control; that is 
their character or the type of person they are. Research 
has shown that depressed subjects express more 
characterological self-blame than nondepressed subjects 
(Janoff-Bulman, 1979; Peterson, Schwartz, & Seligman, 1981), 
and that behavioral self-blame is generally incompatible 
with depression (Peterson et al., 1981). This suggests that 
depressed individuals see themselves as both responsible for 
their own unhappiness and unable to control the causes of 
it. (There is a body of research, in an area referred to as 
the illusion of control, that suggests that nondepressed 
individuals tend to overestimate their control over chance
16
laboratory tasks. See, for example, Gol.in, Terrel, & 
Johnson, 1979; Golin, Terrel, Weitz, & D r o s t , 1979; Abramson 
& Alloy, 1984. Some authors, e.g. Alloy & Abramson, 1979 
and Layne, 1983, suggest that this implies that nondepressed 
individuals have unrealistically optimistic views of the 
future.) If an individual perceives some negative 
characteristic of himself or herself as responsible for a 
situation, and if that characteristic is not under his or 
her control, then the situation is not subject, to his or her 
modification. If he or she cannot act to modify the 
situation, then the possiblity exists that it will not be 
modified. The present situation may come to be seen as 
extending indefinitely into the future.
Overgeneralization. In an investigation of depression 
and self-punitive behavior, Carver and Ganellen (1983) 
developed a self-report measure which assessed three 
different factors: high standards, self-criticism, and 
overgeneralization. Only overgeneralization was found to 
relate strongly to depression. More recently, the same 
measure of overgeneralization has been found to be a more 
robust predictor of Beck Depression Inventory score (Beck, 
1967) than the CBQ, the ASQ, or a measure of 
characterological self-balme (Carver, Ganellen, & Behar- 
Mitrani, 1985). While the Carver et al. (1985) study can be 
criticized on the grounds that it used only college 
undergraduates with relatively low levels of depression as
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subjects, it still suggests that overgeneralization plays a 
significant role in depressives1 cognitions. Similarly, 
Fennell and Campbell (1984) report that overgeneralizaton 
across situations had the strongest relationship with 
depression of any of the four types of cognitive distortion 
measured by the CQ. As previously noted, overgeneralizaton 
is an important concept in Beck's (1967) theory of 
depression and, under the label of stable, global 
attributions, in the reformulated learned helplessness 
theory of depression.
Summary
We have seen that several instruments used to assses 
attributional style or distorted cognitions in depressed 
individuals contain references to hypothetical future 
events, and that what is coded as a stable attribution or a 
distorted cognition frequently suggests that the depressed 
individual sees the future as being very similar to the 
present. These types of attributions and distortions are 
often strongly correlated with depression. There is also 
research indicating that depressed individuals may view the 
future as unchanging because they perceive it as caused by 
flaws in their character over which they have no control and 
therefore cannot change, and because they overgeneralize 
about the causes and consequences of negative events. In 
fact, the depressed person's view of the future may be 
considered another form of overgeneralization, that is
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generalizing that the future will be just like the present. 
No study reviewed, however, made direct, unambiguous 
comparisons of the way depressed persons imagine their own 
futures and the way they see their own lives in the present. 
This conclusion is reached first because subjects are often 
asked to imagine hypothetical future scenarios which may 
have little relevance to their own lives, and second because 
direct comparisons of present and future simply have not 
been asked for in the research to date.
Other Research on Depression and Future Out look 
Other research on the future outlook of depressed 
individuals comes from three areas: negative future outlook 
as a distinguishing characteristic of depression, prediction 
of suicidal behavior, and constricted future time sense.
Each of these areas will be discussed below. Although this 
research shows that depressed individuals have negative and 
constricted views of the future, it once again fails to make 
direct comparisons with their present outlook on life. 
Negative Future Outlook
As noted earlier, Beck (1967) reported that 78% of 
depressed subjects endorsed an item on the Beck Depression 
Inventory indicating a negative view of the future, as 
compared to only 22% of nondepressed control subjects.
Other researchers have looked at future expectations of 
success, observed verbal interactions of depressed couples, 
analyzed speech patterns, or attempted to relate hope (or
19
lack of hope) to depression.
Fibel and Hale (1978) developed the Generalized 
Expectancy for Success Scale (GESS) to assess subjects' 
overall expectations for future success. The GESS consists 
of 30 statements about the future, each beginning with the 
p h r a s e  "In the f u t u r e  I e x p e c t  I w i l l  ...". E x a m p l e s  of 
outcomes include "be a good parent" or "have problems 
working with others" (Fibel & Hale, 1978, p. 927). Subjects 
are asked to rate the probability that each statement will 
be true about them in the future on a 5-point Likert scale. 
Test items were selected from a pool which sampled a variety 
of situational domains, including public life, private life, 
family life, interpersonal relationships, and work.
Research using the GESS has found that low expectancies for 
future success are significantly correlated with various 
measures of depression (Fibel & Hale, 1978) and that they 
are not typical of nondepressed psychiatric populations 
(Layne, Lefton, Walters, & Merry, 1983). While the GESS 
does address expectations about the future directly, it does 
not make specific comparisons with perceptions of the 
present. Given depressives' negative view of the world 
(Beck, 1967), one can postulate that such a comparison would 
find that depressed individuals' low expectations of future 
success are comparable to their perceptions of the present.
Linden, Hautzinger, and Hoffman (1983) observed 
interactions of distressed couples. They found that
negative expectation of the future was one of several 
interactional styles whcih differentiated couples in which 
one partner was suffering from a major depression from 
nondepressed couples. Similarly, Karoly and Ruehlman (1983) 
conducted’ a semantic differential analysis that compared the 
future outlook of depressed and nondepressed college 
undergraduates. They found that depressed students rated 
the f u t u r e  as less a c t i v e  (e.g. s l o w  vs. fast, p a s s i v e  vs. 
active), less potent (e.g. weak vs. strong, ineffective vs. 
effective), and less evaluatively positive (e.g. unpleasant 
vs. pleasant, sad vs. happy) than nondepressed students.
Gottschalk (1974) analyzed speech content of various 
psychiatric and co mparison groups, including crisis clinic 
patients and terminally ill cancer patients. He developed a 
scale to measure the amount of hope in their verbalizations 
and found a significant negative correlation between the 
level of hope and the level of depression in his subjects.
Erickson, Post, and Paige (1975) assessed hope in 
psychiatric populations by asking subjects to rate the 
probability and importance of achieving various goals. This 
line of research follows definitions of hope given by 
Stotland (1969) and Melges and Bowlby (1969), which suggest 
that hope is the multiplicative product of goal importance 
and perceived probability of goal attainment. Erickson et 
al. (1975) found that depression has a significant negative 
correlation with perceived probability of goal attainment.
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The research on negative future outlook as a 
characteristic of depression indicates that depressed 
individuals view the future as a negative state of existence 
in which there is a low likelihood of attaining desired 
goals. Once again, however, no direct comparisons of 
depressives' views of the present and future were made. 
Prediction of Suicidal Behavior
Negative future outlook and lack of hope have also been 
used to predict suicidal behavior. Beck, Weissman, Lester, 
and Trexler (1974) developed the Beck Hopelessness Scale 
(BHS). This 20 true-false item iventory, which consists of 
statements like "I don't expect to get what I really want" 
and "In the f u t u r e  I e x p e c t  to s u c c e e d  in w h a t  c o n c e r n s  me 
the m o s t "  (Beck et al., 1974, p. 862), taps a t t i t u d e s  about 
the future. Research using the BHS has found that depressed 
college students (Prociuk, Breen, & Lussier, 1976) and 
psychiatric patients (Beck et al., 1974) have negative 
expectations of the future, and that these expectations 
improve as the patient recovers or succeeds in various tasks 
(Beck et al., 1974). More significantly, high BHS scores 
have been found to be good predictors of suicidal behavior. 
An early study found that hopelessness as measured by the 
BHS correlated more strongly with suicidal intent than did 
overall level of depression (Minkoff, Bergman, Beck, & Beck, 
1973). Although there has been some recent controversy 
about high BHS scores being confounded with socially
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desirable responding (Linehan & Neilson, 1981, 1983; Nevid, 
1983; Petrie & Chamberlin, 1983; Strosahl, Linehan, &
Chiles, 1984), the BHS remains a good predictor of suicidal 
behavior. In a recently comp leted 10 year study of 207 
patients hospitalized for suicidal ideation, high BHS scores 
correctly identified 91% of eventual suicides (Beck, Steer, 
Kovacs, & Garrison, 1985).
. An earlier technique for assessing suicide potential 
has a more direct bearing on the way depressed people 
imagine the future. This technique looked at future time 
perspective and imagined degree of future involvement of 
depressed patients (Yufit, Benzies, Fonte, & Fawcett, 1970). 
Depressed and comparison groups were asked to pick a year in 
the future and to complete open-ended questions about what 
they would be doing at that time. Responses were scored for 
extent of time projection, amount of change imagined, degree 
of detail, and consistency, quantity, and quality of 
responsiveness. It was found that depressed subjects had 
significantly lower mean total scores, projected 
significantly fewer years into the future, and elaborated 
less on future fantasies than nondepressed comparison 
subjects. Although Yufit et al. did ask subjects to make a 
direct comparison of present and future (i.e. amount of 
change imagined) they did not report data for results on 
individual items.
Negative future outlook and lack of hope clearly
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represent an important component of depression and appear to 
be good indicators of suicidal intent. Although one study 
came close, no published study reported comparison of the 
way depressed individuals imagine the future with their 
perceptions of the present.
Future Time Projection
Yufit et al. (1970) found that depressed subjects 
tended to have more restricted views of the future in that 
they projected (imagined) significantly fewer years into the 
future than nondepressed subjects. Similarly, Melges and 
Fougerousse (1966) found that depressed subjects endorsed 
items indicating changes in time sense and difficulty 
distinguishing past, present, and future. Two other 
findings in the area of future time projection are 
indirectly related to the way depressed individuals imagine 
the future. Wohlford (1966) found that undergraduates asked 
to write about a pleasant future experience tended to have 
more extended future time perspectives than undergraduates 
asked to write about an unpleasant future experience or 
about their own death. Thinking about unpleasant 
experiences or death may create unhappy moods which are 
components of or mi m i c  depressive symptoms. Also, Teahan 
(1958) found that adolescents who were high academic 
achievers were both more optimistic and had a more extended 
future time perspective than low academic achievers of 
comparable intellectual level. It appears that current
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success and optimism (or the lack thereof) are related to 
future time perspective.
Finally, it is interesting to note that Lazarus (1968, 
1971, 1972) has reported on a method of treating depression 
which he refers to as "time projection with positive 
reinforcement". In this procedure depressed patients are 
taught imagery techniques or are hypnotized. They are then 
instructed to vividly imagine themselves experiencing 
positive events from the past such as pleasurable 
activities, spending time with other people, or any other 
behavior which the patient formerly associated with pleasant 
feelings. Positive imagery is gradually extended into the 
future until the depressive incident is left far behind. 
Lazarus (1968) reports dramatic results for single session 
applications of this technique with patients who were able 
to experience vivid images and who were suffering from acute 
depressive episodes. While it must be noted that this is a 
single author reporting on a series of uncontrolled case 
studies, L a z a r u s ’ results suggest that positive future 
images may, at least in some cases, be incompatible with 
depression.
Summary
We have seen that negative expectations of the future 
are a characteristic of depression, and that they are 
seriously implicated in suicidal behavior. We have also 
seen that depressed people imagine the future less clearly
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and as occupying a shorter time span than nondepressed 
individuals. There is even some evidence, albeit scanty, 
that depression and expectations of a positive, pleasant 
future are incompatible. Yet no study reports a direct 
comparison of depressed individuals' experience of the 
p r e s e n t  w i t h  the w a y  they i m a g i n e  the future. I t h i n k  that 
depressed people imagine the future as an essentially 
unchanging extension of the present, and the present study 
seeks to investigate that possibility.
The Present Study 
The present study was designed to ask subjects to make 
a direct comparison between the way they view their persent 
li v e s  and the w a y  they i m a g i n e  the future. T h i s  wa s  done by 
directing subjects in induced dysphoric and elated moods to 
imagine a future scene and compare this scene to their 
perception of the present. A few co m m e n t s  on the methodolgy 
are appropriate.
Use of Induced Moods 
The use of induced dysphoria as an analog of depression 
in laboratory studies has become a c o m m o n  and accepted 
practice (Goodwin « Williams, 1982). The present study used 
subjects in an induced dysphoric mood rather than clinically 
depressed subjects for reasons of practicality and clarity. 
Obtaining a large sample of clinically depressed subjects 
for research purposes can be a time-consuming and difficult 
task, especially when treatment is not offered. Moreover,
26
depression is a heterogeneous disorder with a number of 
components (APA, 1980; Lewinsohn & Lee, 1981). Since a 
major purpose of this study was to demonstrate the 
usefulness of the proposed methodolgy in investigating 
depression, it was chosen to work with a single, important 
characteristic of depression in order to obtain a more 
homogeneous sample of behavior and a clearer test of the 
experimental hypotheses.
The most commonly used procedure for mood induction was 
developed by Velten (1968). Subjects are directed to read 
and try to experience a set of 50 to 60 self-referrent 
statements which are ordered so as to progressively produce 
a dysphoric, elated, or neutral mood. This procedure has 
been shown to produce changes in both self-reported mood and 
in specific observable behaviors such as counting speed, 
writing speed, silent pauses in spontaneous speech, and 
persistence in attempts to complete insoluable line tracing 
problems (Goodwin S Williams, 1982). However, the method 
has been criticized as being unduly influenced by demand 
characteristics (Buchwald, Strack, & Coyne, 1981; Polivy & 
Doyle, 1980).
Another mood induction procedure involves the use of 
autobiographical memories. For example, Brewer, DoOghtie, 
and Lubin (1980) asked subjects to recall three 
progressively more distressing autobiographical events, and 
compared the resulting mood changes to those induced by
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reading self-referrent statements. They found that the 
autobiographical procedure produced greater mood changes, as 
measured by various depression inventories and adjective 
checklists, than Velten's procedure and they maintain that 
it is a more powerful technique. Other variations of the 
autobiographical technique involve the use of hypnosis (e.g. 
Hart & Means, in press; Baumann, Cialdini, & Kenrick, 1981) 
or of quasi-hypnotic procedures (e.g. Wilson, Means, & 
Guthrie, 1982) to enhance recall and the resulting induced 
mood. The latter technique was chosen for this study 
because it is suitable for group administration, does not 
require screening for hypnotic suggestibility, and because 
it is compatible with the techniques chosen to help subjects 
imagine the future. (Some of the methodology of the present 
study was adapted from Hart & Means, in press. Hart and 
Means hypnotized subjects, and used either imagery-based or 
cognitive-based manipul ations to induce a dysphoric mood. 
They then compared the effectiveness of imagery-based and 
cognitive-based treatments in alleviating the dysphoric 
mood. It was found that both types of treatment were 
effective for both types of mood induction, but that an 
imagery-based treatment was more effective for treating 
imagery-induced dysphoric moods than was a cognitive-based 
t r e a t m e n t .)
For the purposes of this study, dysphoria refers to an 
unpleasant feeling state. .Although at least one source
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(APA, 1980, p. 363) includes the term irritability in its 
description of dysphoria, I prefer to restrict the use of 
dysphoria to feelings of sadness or unhappiness. Lewinsohn  
and Lee (1981, p. 139) state that patients often use words 
like "down", "blue", "depressed", "hopeless", "helpless", 
"despondent", and "pessimistic" to com m u n i c a t e  dysphoria. I 
consider dysphoria to be the major component of depression, 
although dysphoria in the absence of other symptoms does not 
necessarily imply pathology (APA, 1980, pp. 213-214). 
Similarly, the term elation refers to a mood that is more 
cheerful than normal, and does not imply the presenece of 
p a t h o l o g y .
Comparison of Present and Future 
A 15 item self-report questionnaire was developed to 
compare subjects' imagined futures to the scene which they 
imagined to change their mood (see Chapter Two and Appendix 
A). It was originally intended to ask for a direct 
comparison with subjects' perceptions of the present, but 
pilot data revealed that subjects found these comparisons 
too confusing to make easily, and that reference to the 
present made it too difficult for them to maintain the 
induced mood. It was therefore decided to compare the 
future image to the mood induction image, under the critical 
assumption that the mood induction procedure would produce 
m emories which would allow subjects to make comparisons 
which were comparable to the ones they would make if they
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were experiencing the imagined past scene in the present. 
Three different comparisons were made. The first, 
uniqueness of the imagined scene, assessed the amount of 
creativity or newness with which the individual imagines the 
future. In a sense, it compared the future with both the 
present and the past. The second comparison, amount of 
c h a n g e  f r o m  the pre s e n t ,  a s k e d  the s u b j e c t  to m a k e  a d i r e c t  
comparison of the present and the future. The third 
comparison asked the subject to rate the degree of imagined 
subjective i m p r ovement or worsening in the future situation 
as compared to the present. These comparisons were referred 
to as Change-Factors. It was not clear prior to the study 
which of the three comparisons might.show the most 
difference, but it was predicted that subjects in the elated 
mood would imagine future scenes which they would rate as 
more unique, and as showing more change and imp r o v e m e n t  as 
compared to the present than would subjects in the dysphoric 
m o o d .
Each of the three comparisons was made in four 
different categories: the image as a whole, imagined 
feelings, imagined behaviors, and imagined thoughts. The 
relationship between cogniton, affect, and behavior, and the 
relationship between image, cognition, and affect are 
controversial (e.g. Ahsen, 1982; Ellis, 1985; Hart & Means, 
in press; Kleinginna & Kleinginna, 1985; Lazarus, 1984; 
Zajonc, 1984). Since it was not the purpose of this study
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to attempt to resolve these controversies, no prediction 
about which of the categories would show the largest 
difference between elated and dysphoric groups was made. 
However, the affect-co gnition-behavior triad does provide a 
convenient way to break down the imagined future scene and 
the data may eventually prove useful in examining the 
relationship between these three constructs.
Items to assess image intensity and image clarity were 
also included in the questionnaire. It was predicted that 
subjects in the elated group would imagine events occurring 
farther into the future than the dysphoric group. Although 
there is some evidence that dysphoric subjects may have 
i m a g e s  w h i c h  are not as c l e a r  as th o s e  of e l a t e d  s u b j e c t s  
(e.g. Y u f i t  et al., 1970), it w a s  t h o u g h t  that the e v i d e n c e  
was insufficient to make a prediction about responses to the 
image clarity item. No differences in image intensity were 
predicted between the two groups, but it was thought that 
image intensity might operate as a modifying factor on the 
other scores. A set of statistical comparisons in which 
questionnaire scores were transformed by multiplication by 
the intensity score was planned.
Social Desirability
Although socially desirable responding was not expected 
to play a significant or critical role in this study, a 
measure of social desirability was included to examine the 
role of this variable for two reasons. First, if the
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results of this study prove significant, future research 
using clinically depressed populations is planned. Social 
desirability was assessed as a preliminary step in the 
validation of this questionnaire. Second, as previously 
mentioned, there is some controversy as to whether the Eeck 
H o p e l e s s n e s s S c a l e  is confounded v/ith social desirability. 
While much of this controversy seems to center around which 
measure of social desirability is used (Strosahl, Linehan, & 
Chiles, 1984), it may be possible to clarify this issue by 
making comparisons between the questionnaire being developed 
in this study, the Beck Hopelessness Scale, and socially 
desirable responding.
Hypotheses
The major hypotheses of the present study can be 
summarized as follows:
1. Subjects in the dysphoric group were expected to 
rate their imagined future scenes as less unique than 
subjects in the elated group.
2. Subjects in the dysphoric group were expected to 
rate their imagined future scenes as showing less change as 
compared to the present than were subjects in the elated 
g r o u p .
3. Subjects in the dysphoric group were expected to 
rate their imagined future scenes as showing essentially no 
i m p r ovement or worsening, while subjects in the elated group 
were expected to rate their imagi ned future scenes as
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significantly improved.
4. Hypotheses 1 through 3 were expected to be true for 
the imagined scene as a whole, and for imagined thoughts, 
feelings, and behaviors taken separately.
5. Subjects in the dysphoric group were expected to 
rate their imagined future scenes as showing less change 
f r o m  the p r e s e n t  on a c o m b i n e d  m e a s u r e  of all of the c h a n g e  
scores than will subjects in the elated group.
6. Subjects in the dysphoric group were expected to 
imagine future Scenes that involve less time projection than 
will subjects in the elated group.
In addition, it was expected that social desirability 
would not be significantly related to any of the measures 
involving the imagined future scene. A final, minor 
hypothesis was that image intensity might act in a 
multiplicative manner to increase the patterns described in 
hypotheses 1 through 6.
CHAPTER TWO 
METHOD
Subjects
One hundred college undergraduates (55 females, 45 
males) recruited from an Introductory Psychology course 
served as subjects for this experiment. Participation 
partially fulfilled a course requirement. Subjects ranged 
in age from 18 to 57 years, the mean age being 21,4 years. 
Treatments were conducted in groups of no larger than 12 
subjects each. Subjects were assigned to treatment groups 
on the basis of sign-up, and treatment groups were randomly 
assigned to receive either the Elated or the Dysphoric mood 
induction, subject to an attempt to balance the number of 
male and female subjects across treatments. (Due to a small 
subject pool and time constraints it was not possible to 
achieve an exact balance for sex of subjects across 
treatments.) Data from two subjects were discarded prior to 
analysis. One female subject in the Elated group failed to 
properly follow directions, and one male subject in the 
Dysphoric group indicated that he had been unable to respond 
to'the Dysphoric mood induction. This resulted in final 
totals of 25 females and 24 males receiving the Dysphoric 
mood induction, and 29 females and 20 males receiving the 
Elated mood induction.
Materials
Each subject was given an Experimental Booklet (EB)
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containing directions, spaces for recording descriptions of 
imagery, and copies of the C r o w n e - M a r l o w e  Social 
Desirability Scale (SDS; Crowne & Marlowe, 1964), the Future 
Change Questionnaire (FCQ), and the Mood Assessment Scale. 
(See Appendix A.) Directions were presented by a male 
experimenter, except for the relaxation instructions, mood 
inductions, and imagery instructions, which were tape- 
recorded by a female experimenter v/ho was experienced in 
hypnotic induction. Appendix A contains all of the 
materials in the EB plus the instructions to the 
experimenter. The booklets handed out to the subjects were 
identical to the one in Appendix A except that the 
instructions to the experimenter were deleted.
C r o w n e - M a r l o w e  Social Desirability Scale. The SDS is a 
33 true-false item inventory used to assess the tendancy of 
subjects to give socially desirable responses rather than 
honest self-evaluations. Although Strosahl, Linehan, & 
Chiles (1984) have criticized the SDS as measuring something 
other than social desirability, recent research by Paulhus 
(1984) has demonstrated that the SDS loads on two factors 
which are important in socially desirable responding. He 
labels these factors impression man a g e m e n t  and selfr 
deception. The SDS has been widely used in previous 
research and was chosen for that reason. (See Appendix B.)
Future Change Questionnaire. The FCQ is a 14 item 
questionnaire designed to compare the way subjects imagine
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the future with the scene imagined in the mood induction, 
and to assess image quality and image intensity. The first 
12 items, numbered 1 through 12, are divided into four 
Categories: the image as a whole, imagined emotions, 
imagined behaviors, and imagined cognitions. Each of these 
Categories is defined briefly for the subject at the 
appropriate point. Under each Category, three Change- 
Factors are assessed: uniqueness of the imagined scene, 
amount of change from the mood induction scene, and 
impro v e m e n t / w o r s e n i n g  compared to the mood induction scene. 
The last two items, numbered 13 and 14, assess image clarity 
and image intensity. Responses are recorded by placing a 
check mark at the appropriate point on unmarked scales which 
are 125 m m  long. The endpoints of each scale are anchored 
by suitable descriptors. Responses are coded by location of 
check mark, measured in millimeters from the left end of the 
scale for i t e m s  2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, and 14, and f r o m  
the ri g h t  end of the s c a l e  for. i t e m s  1, 5, 6, 10, and 12. 
(See A p p e n d i x  C.)
Relaxation Instructions. A short relaxation induction 
combining progressive muscule relaxation and relaxing 
imagery was presented to the subjects prior to the mood 
induction and imagery portion of the experiment. (See 
A p p e n d i x  D.)
Hood Inductions. Dysphoric and Elated mood inductions 
were nonhypnotic variants of the imaginal mood induction
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procedure used by Hart and Means (in press). These 
procedures included components of visual imagery, auditory 
imagery, and physiological responses.
Subjects were asked to visualize and relive scenes from 
their past in which they felt either happy or sad. Goodwin 
and W i l l i a m s  (1982) report that this type of mood induction 
is more powerful than reading or reciting self-referrent 
mood statements. Hart and Means (in press) found that 
imagery is also a powerful tool for inducing moods. (See 
Appendixes E and F.)
The effectiveness of these mood inductions was assessed 
in two pilot studies. (Although the pilot studies used 
slightly different methodolgies, the mood inductions were 
essentially identical and data from both studies were 
combined to obtain a larger sample size.) Following either 
the Elated or the Dysphoric mood induction, subjects were 
asked to complete the Profile of Mood States (POMS; McNair, 
Lorr, & Droppleman, 1971). Scores were obtained for the 
POMS factors of Depression/Dejection and V i gor/Activity, 
which are reported to assess moods comparable to the desired 
Dysphoric and Elated mood states. The Elated mood induction 
produced a mean Vigor/Activity score of 21.05 and a mean 
Depression/Dejection score of 4.70 using combined data from 
both pilot studies. The Dysphoric mood induction produced a 
mean Vigor/Activity score of 2.55 and a mean 
Depression/Dejection score of 35.27, again using combined
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data. Separate t_-tests comp aring the POMS scores for the 
Elated and Dysphoric groups indicated that the mood 
inductions did produce groups which differed significantly 
on bot h V i g o r / A c t i v i t y  (_t(29) = 2.66, _£ <  .05) and 
Depression/Dejection (_t(29) = 3.82, £  <  .01). Furthermore, 
the mean Depression/Dejection score of 35.27 is comparable 
to the Depression/Dejection score of 30.2 which McNair et 
al. (1971) report obtaining from a group of individuals 
diagnosed as undergoing neurotic-depressive reactions (p.
15) .
Imagery Instructions. In order to facilitate and 
intensify future images generated by the subjects, a set of 
taped imagery instructions using components of visual 
imagery, tactile imagery, auditory imagery, and kinesthetic 
imagery was developed. (See Appendix G.)
Mood Assessment Scale. A 201 mm  scale, marked at the 
endpoints with vertical lines and at the center with the 
character "0", was used to check on the effectiveness of the 
mood inductions. The endpoints and center of the scale were 
anchored wit h the descriptors "the most sadness you can 
imagine", "no sadness or happiness", and "the most happiness 
you can imagine" from left to right, respectively.
Responses were recorded by placing a check mark at the 
appropriate location on the scale. Responses were coded by 
measuring the distance of the check mark, in millimeters, 
from the left endpoint. (See Appendix H.)
38
The usefulness of this scale was evaluated during the 
previously mentioned pilot studies. Hood ratings were shown 
to correlate at an acceptably high level with the 
Depression/Dejection score (_r = .86) and with the 
Vigor/Activity score (_r = .84) of the POMS.
Procedure
1. Upon arrrival, and before entering the room, 
subjects were individually given a brief screening for 
psychological problems (Appendix I). Subjects reporting 
psychological problems were informed that they could leave 
the experiment with credit. Subjects were seated and the 
Experimental Booklet (EB) was distributed. Verbal 
instructions to the subjects were presented by a male 
experimenter, with the exception of the relaxation 
instructions, mood inductions, and imagery instructions, 
which were tape-recorded. As a precaution, two experienced 
graduate students from a Clinical Psychology program were 
present to deal with any serious negative reactions to the 
mood inductions. (No such reactions occurred.) A 
simplified schematic diagram of the basic experimental 
design is presented in Figure 1.
2. Subjects were asked to record their age, sex, and 
year in college on the cover of the EB. The next page of 
the EB included an explanation of the purpose of the 
experiment and the possible risks and benefits involved in 
the mood induction procedures. Confidentiality of imagery
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descriptions was stressed. Subjects were then instructed to 
complete the Social Desirability Scale (SDS).
3. The tape-recorded relaxation instructions (Appendix 
D) w e r e  p r e s e n t e d  at t h i s  time, f o l l o w e d  by the tape- 
recorded elated or dysphoric mood induction (Appendixes E 
and F).
4. Following the tape-recorded mood induction, 
subjects were asked
to a s s e s s  their m o o d  and to w r i t e  a b r i e f  d e s c r i p t i o n  of the 
scene that they had imagined to change their mood. Space 
for recording the imagined scene was provided in the EB. As 
a measure of time projection, subjects were also asked to 
choose a specefic time in the future which they would like 
to imagine, and to record this time in the EB.
5. Next, the tape-recorded imagery instructions 
(Appendix G) were presented to the subjects. The subjects 
were asked to imagine a scene one year in the future. They 
were then directed to briefly describe the scene and to 
complete the Future Change Questionnaire (FCQ).
6. Subjects in the Dysphoric group were given a tape- 
recorded mood induction to elevate their mood at this time. 
Subjects in the both groups were then given the opportunity 
to visualize a calm, peaceful scene. This was not an 
integral part of the experiment, but rather was done to 
counter the effects of the mood induction procedures.
7. All subjects were asked a series of questions aimed
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at obtaining further information on: 1) The effectiveness of
the relaxation induction; 2) The effects of the mood 
inductions; and 3) The effectiveness of the imagery 
instructions. Answers were recorded in the EB.
8. Subjects' current mood was assessed. Subjects who 
r e p o r t e d  that th e i r  m o o d  w a s  not at le a s t  as p o s i t i v e  as it 
had been at the beginning of the experiment were offered an 
opportunity to discuss their experience with the 
experimenter or one of the supervising graduate students.
All s u b j e c t s  w e r e  then told that they c o u l d  r e c e i v e  a br i e f  
summary of the results of the experiment if they would leave 
their name and address on a separate sign-up sheet.
CHAPTER THREE 
RESULTS
Assessment of Mood
Subjects' mood was assessed at two points during the 
study: immediately following the mood induction and again 
following the imagined future scene. The initial mood 
assessment indicated that the mood inductions did 
effectively produce different mood states in the Elated (El) 
and D y s p h o r i c  (Dys) g r o u p s  (2Le l  = 129.9, SJ^El = 19.2; IfDys = 
49.33; S_Dj)ys = 18.0). Separate t_-tests indicated that male 
and female subjects did not differ in their reported 
responses to the Elated and Dysphoric mood inductions (both 
_t's less than 0,15). However, the second mood assessment 
revealed that 33% (16 of 49; 10 females, 6 males) of the 
subjects in the Dysphoric group not only failed to hold the
dysphoric mood while imagining the future, but reported mood
\
elevation to levels comparable to the Elated group (see 
Table 1). This is a highly significant change in mood 
(_t(31) = 5.00, j) <. 0.001), and hereafter these subjects will 
be considered as a separate mood group (symbolized by Dys- 
El). Comparison of the subjects in the Dys-El group to the 
remaining subjects in the Dysphoric group indicated that the 
two groups did not differ significantly in their response to 
the Dysphoric mood induction (t_(48) = .26, n_s). Small,
nonsignificant increases in mood were noted for both the 
Elated and the Dysphoric groups (see Table 1).
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Tatole 1
Data trom First and Second Mood Assessments for Different Mood droops 
Mood Group First Assessment Second Asscssncnt
M SD M 30
Hated 129.88 19.21 138.&9 27.31*
Qjrsphorla 1*9.33 17.99 55.33 23.38
Dys-El ill*.63 17.99 131.50 16.77
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The failure of some subjects to hold the dysphoric mood 
while imagining the future was not expected based on the 
r e s u l t s  of pi l o t  s tudies, and m a y  have b e e n  due to m i n o r  
methodological changes. Possible explanations will be 
discussed in Chapter 4. Addition of a third mood group 
created several problems for planned subsequent analyses. 
First, it was no longer possible to obtain the reasonably 
sized groups with equal numbers of subjects necessary for a 
planned factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA). Rather than 
discarding data from a large number of subjects, it was 
decided to substitute on e-way ANOVAs which examined each 
variable of interest across all three mood groups. Use of 
one-way ANOVAS resulted in the loss of infor mation about 
interactions among Sex of Subjects, FCQ C h a n g e - F a c t o r , and 
FCQ Categories. While of some interest, this information 
was not considered crucial to demonstrating the main 
hypotheses ot this study. As an ancillary exploratory 
analysis, data from Elated and Dysphoric subjects was 
randomly selected in such a manner as to obtain the largest 
possible sample size for the planned 2 (Hoods) X 2 (Sex of 
Subjects) X 4 (Categories) X 3 (Change-Factors) factorial 
ANOVA. The results of these analyses are reported in 
following sections.
A s e c o n d  p r o b l e m  w a s  that ma n y  of the F C Q  s c o r e s  for 
the Dys-El group were artificially elevated. This occurred 
because subjects were asked to compare imagined past and
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f u t u r e  s c e n e s  and to ra t e  the a m o u n t  of c h a n g e  or d e g r e e  of 
improvement. These questions were intended to compare two 
h a p p y  or t w o  sad scenes. W h e n  the s c e n e  c h a n g e s  f r o m  a sad 
one to a h a p p y  one la r g e  a m o u n t s  of r e p o r t e d  c h a n g e  and 
imp r o v e m e n t  can be expected. Such large FCQ scores render 
statistically significant results obtained from analyses 
including these data less meaningful with respect to the 
experimental hypotheses.
One-Way Analyses of FCQ Scores
The data for each FCQ item was examined using a one-way 
ANOVA across all three mood groups. The results of these 
analyses are summarized in Table 2. The one-way ANOVAs for 
four items (items 3, 5, 6, and 12) indicated statistically 
significant differences among the means for all three mood 
groups. These items were ratings of improvement of the 
image as a whole, change in imagined emotions, improvement 
in imagined emotions, and i m p r ovement in imagined 
cognitions. Neuman-Keuls tests found that the difference 
between the means of the Dysphoric and Elated groups reached 
statisical significance at the .05 level only for 
improvement of imagined cognitions. Elated subjects rated 
significantly more improvement in their imagined futre 
cognitions than Dysphoric subjects, and Dys-El subjects 
rated significantly more imp r o v e m e n t  in their imagined 
future cognitions than either of the other two mood groups. 
In the other three cases, Neuman-Keuls tests among the means
1*6
Table 2
Means, Standard Deviations, and Fisher's-Ratios for Future Change 
Questionnaire Scores and Related Data for Different Mood Groupe
Mood Group
Elated (n = 1*9) iysphorie (n ■ 33) Dys-El (n ■ 16)
Item M SD M SD M SD F(2, 95)
1 57. 01* 38.91 1*5.00 36.65 1*5.88 1*1*.1*1 1.11
2 72.91* 37.33 69.21* 38.1*1 81.56 38.69 0.57
3 88.20 21*. 56 75.61*a 35.59 99.06a 21*. 95 3.92*
1* 53.35 37.1*1 39.91 28.79 1*5.75 38.51* 1.1*8
5 57.91*a 37.00 71.21̂ 1*1.30 92.19a>b 38.1*2 1*.89*
6 81.67a 21.37 79.79, 30.60 101.50a>b 23*58 I*. 53*
7 1*1*. 69 36.1*8 35.91* 31*.37 36.00 36.1*1 0.72
3 72.91* 1*3.09 83.21* 36.01 90.50 35.1*0 1.1*3
9 82.39 26.80 81*. 97 27.03 95.75 29.33 1.1*5
10 51.06 39.06 1*5.27 1*1.01* 38.13 32.99 0.72
11 62.39 39.28 66.09 1*3.20 77.13 1*1*. 05 0.76
12 87.57a 22.55 73.79.a 38.77 109.19.a 20.37 8.22*
13 91*. 20 22.35 88.88 25.15 96.13 18.61* 0.75
ii* 85.10 21*.06 80.1*5 27.10 90.75 17.99 1.00
Total 812.2 182.8 770.1 21*2.1 912.6 191*. 9 2.57
SD 12.73 5.33 13.15 5.11 11*.00 6.06 0.31*
TP 1077 939.8 1631* 1980 1020 921.5 0.37
TTP 26.06 19.19 32.38 23.29 26.19 16.75 1.05
Note. For any row, means with the ssme subscript differ significantly from 
eaeh other. Total ■ Total Change Score. SD ■ Social Desirability Score.
TP ■ Time Projection, TIP ■ Transformed Time Projeetion.
*£  .05
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found no statistically significant differences between the 
means of the Elated and Dysphoric groups. Statistical 
significance for these items was due primarily to the 
presence of large change scores for the Dys-El group which, 
as previously noted, were artificially elevated.
Examination of the data showed that seven FCQ items 
( i t e m s  1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 10) had n o n s i g n i f i c a n t  t r e n d s  
in the predicted direction, and four FCQ items (items 5, 8, 
9, and 11) showed nonsignificant trends opposite to the 
predicted direction. (In this paper trend simply indicates 
that the m e a s urement is in the predicted direction.) As 
predicted, Elated subjects rated their imagined future 
images, emotions, behaviors, and cognitions as more unique 
than Dysphoric subjects. Elated subjects also endorsed more 
change in their imagined future images, and more improv ement 
in their imagined future images and feelings. Contrary to 
predictions, Dysphoric subjects endorsed more change in 
their imagined feelings, actions, and cognitions, and more 
improvement in their imagined actions than Elated subjects. 
Uniqueness ratings for the Dys-El subjects were comparable 
to the other two mood groups in all four categories. In all 
cases the change and improvement scores of the Dys-El group 
w e r e  h i g h e r  th a n  th o s e  of the ot h e r  t w o  m o o d  groups.
The mean scores for image clarity (item 13) and image 
intensity (item 1'4) did not differ significantly across the 
three mood groups.
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Transformations of the FCQ Data
I t e m s  1 t h r o u g h  12 of the FCQ w e r e  t r a n s f o r m e d ,  as 
planned, using the FCQ image clarity and image intensity 
items. Each trans formation was accomplished by multiplying 
the item score by the image clarity or image intensity 
score, and taking the square root of the resulting product. 
One-way ANOVAs were performed on each transformed item. The 
results of these analyses are presented in Appendixes L and 
M.
In general, results obtained using the transformed data 
closely followed those obtained using the untransformed 
data. Using the clari ty-transformed data, the ANOVAs for 
items 3, 5, 6, and 12 indicated statistically significant 
differences among the group means. The means of the Elated 
and Dysphoric groups differed significantly only for 
improvement in imagined cognitions (item 12). Elated 
subjects rated significantly more improvement in imagined 
cognitions than Dysphoric subjects, and Dys-El subjects 
rated significantly more impr o v e m e n t  in imagined cognitions 
than either of the other two mood groups. Elated and 
Dysphoric means for items 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 10 showed 
nonsignificant trends in the predicted direction, while 
E l a t e d  and D y s p h o r i c  m e a n s  for i t e m s  5, 8, and 11 s h o w  
nonsignificant trends opposite to the predicted direction. 
The Elated and Dysphoric means for item 9 were essentially 
equal after tranformation by image clarity.
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Using the intensity-transformed data, the ANOVAs for 
items 3, 5, 6, and 12 indicated statistically significant 
differences among the group means. Once again, the Elated 
and Dysphoric means differed significantly only for item 12, 
improvement in imagined cognitions. Elated subjects rated 
significantly more improvement in imagined cognitions than 
Dysphoric subjects, and Dys-El subjects rated significantly 
more improvement than either of the other two mood groups. 
The Elated and Dysphoric means for items 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 
and 10 showed nonsignificant trends in the predicted 
direction, while the Elated and Dysphoric means for items 5 
and 8 showed nonsignificant trends opposite to the predicted 
direction. The Elated and Dysphoric means for items 9 and 
11 were essentially equal after transformation by image 
in t e n s i t y .
Total Change Scores
A Total Change score was computed for each subject by 
s u m m i n g  i t e m s  1 t h r o u g h  12 of the FCQ. A o n e - w a y  ANON A was 
used to compare the Total Change scores across all three 
mood groups, and the differences among the means were found 
to be statistically nonsignificant (F(2, 95) = 2.57, njs; see 
Table 2). The Total Change score for the Elated group was 
nonsignificantly larger than the total change score for the 
Dysphoric group, which was in the predicted direction. 
Similar results were obtained using Total Change scores 
obtained by summing the clarity-transformed FCQ items (see
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Appendix L). A one-way ANOVA across all three mood groups 
comparing Total Change scores obtained by su m m i n g  the 
intensity-transformed data did indicate significant 
differences am ong the group means (J?(2, 95) = 3.21, £  .05;
see Appendix M). Neuman-Keuls tests showed that the Elated 
and Dysphoric group means did not differ significantly, and 
that significance was largely due to the presence of 
inflated Dys-El scores.
The c o r r e l a t i o n  of e a c h  of the 12 FCQ i t e m s  w i t h  the 
Total Change score was calculated using data from the Elated 
and Dysphoric groups only. It was decided not to use the 
Dys-El data, since the exagerated change and improvement 
scores would have resulted in distortion of the correlation 
coeffecients. (However, the interested reader can examine 
the correlation matrix for the data from all three mood 
groups in Appendix 0). All of the FCQ items were found to 
correlate significantly and substantially with the Total 
Change Score, the mean correlation coeffecient being .50.
The highest correlation (r_ = .53) was obtained for item 5, 
change in imagined emotions. Examination of the correlation 
matrix shows that individual Change Factors generally 
correlate satisfactorily across Categories, correlations 
typically lying between .4 and .6, and that different Change 
Factors have satisfactorily low correlations, typically 
between 0 and .2. The correlation matrix is presented in 
Appendix N .
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Time Projection
In the Experimental Booklet subjects were asked to 
r e c o r d  a t i m e  that they w o u l d  like to i m a g i n e  in the fu t u r e  
by indicating the appropriate number of days, weeks, months, 
and/or years. This data was converted into a Time 
Projection score measured in days using the following 
f o r m u l a :
Time Projection = (Years x 365) + (Months x 30) +
(Weeks x 7) + Days.
A one-way ANOVA was used to compare mean Time Projection 
scores across all three mood groups. No statistically 
significant differences among the means were found (_F(2, 95) 
= .37, n_s_; see Table 2). A planned trans formation of the
data was performed in an attempt to reduce the variability 
of the data. The square root of the Time Projection score 
for each subject was used as a transformed score in another 
one-way ANOVA across all three mood groups. Once again, the 
group means did not differ significantly (_F(2, 95) = 1,05,
n s ; see Table 2). Contrary to predictions, the mean Time 
Projection score for the Dysphoric group was
nonsignificantly larger than the mean Time Projection score 
for the Elated group. The mean Time Projection score for 
the the Dys-El group was approximately equal to the mean 
Time Projection score for the Elated group.
Social Desirability
Scores on the C r o w n e - M a r l o w e  Social Desirability scale
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for each mood group were com pared using a one-way ANOVA.
Mean Social Desirability scores did notodiffer significantly 
a m o n g  m o o d  g r o u p s  (£(2, 95) = 0.34, n_s; see T a b l e  2). The 
correlation of the Social Desirability score with each item 
of the FCQ and w i t h  the FC Q  T o t a l  C h a n g e  s c o r e  wa s  
calculated using both the data from all three mood groups 
and the data from the Elated and Dysphoric groups only. As 
anticipated, no significant correlations were obtained. The 
correlation coeffecients are presented in Appendixes N and 
0.
Content of Past and Future Scenes
Although there was no intention of doing formal content 
analysis of subjects' imagined scenes, subjects were 
directed to briefly describe their imagined past and future 
scenes to ensure that they actually complied with the task 
of imagining these scenes. An informal survey of their 
descriptions noted several c o m m o n  themes.
In order to induce a Dysphoric mood, 11 subjects (6 
male, 5 female) recalled scenes involving the death of a 
family member, close friend, or loved pet. Eight subjects 
(5 male, 3 female) recalled scenes in which they felt 
especially lonely. Seven subjects (3 male, 4 female) 
recalled the end of a romantic relationship, and two 
subjects (1 male, 1 fen.ale) recalled family conflicts. Five 
other subjects recalled various scenes which did not fit 
into any of these categories. Subjects in the Dys-El
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recalled similar scenes of death (2.male, 3 female), 
loneliness (1 male, 2 female), romantic breakup (2 male, 1 
female) and family conflict (1 male). Four of the Dys-El 
subjects recalled scenes which did not fit into any of these 
categories.
In order to induce an elated mood 15 subjects (5 male, 
10 female) recalled a happy romantic encounter. Twenty 
subjects (8 male, 12 female) recalled pleasant events or 
activies involving family or friends. Seven subjects (3 
male, 4 female ) recalled athletic successes, and four 
subjects (3 male, 1 female) recalled pleasant scenes from 
nature or the outdoors. Three subjects recalled scenes 
which did not fit into any of these categories. Many scenes 
which were classified in other categories also involved 
pleasant outdoor activities.
Six subjects (3 male, 3 female) in the Dysphoric group 
imagined future scenes involving school-related events. Six 
subjects (1 male, 5 female) imagined scenes involving the 
death of a loved one. Six subjects (3 male, 3 female) 
imagined scenes involving family or friends. Six subjects 
(5 male, 1 female) imagined scenes involving being sad and 
alone. Three subjects (1 male, 2 female) imagined scenes 
involving romantic relationships. Subjects in the Dys-El 
group mostly imagined scenes involving family or friends (4 
male, 5 female) or romantic relations hips (1 male, 3 
female). It should be noted that some subjects in the
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Dysphoric group imagined scenes which were potentially as 
happy as the scenes imagined by subjects in the Dys-El 
group, but did not report significant mood elevation.
In the Elated group 26 subjects (8 male, 18 female) 
imagined future scenes involving some sort of romantic 
relationship. Wedding scenes were especially common. Nine 
subjects (6 male, 3 female) imagined athletic successes. 
Seven subjects (3 male, 4 female) imagined school-related 
events. Four subjects (1 male, 3 female) imagined scenes 
involving friends or family members. Financial and personal 
independence were also c o m m o n  themes in the imagined future 
scenes of the Elated group.
Factorial Analysis of Variance
The loss of 10 female subjects from the Dysphoric 
group, leaving only 15, determined a m a x i m u m  n_ of 15 
subjects per cell for a planned 2 (Moods) X 2 (Sex of 
Subjects) X 4 (Categories) X 3 (Change-Factors) factorial 
ANOVA. Data from 15 subjects for each of the remaining 
cells (Dsyphoric-Male, Elated-Female, Elated-Male) were 
randomly selected and the ANOVA was performed. One main 
effect (Change-Factor) and two interactions (Sex of Subjects 
X Category and Category X Change-Factor) attained 
statistical significance. (The complete summary table for 
the factorial ANOVA is presented in Appendix P.)
Change-Factor refers to the three different aspects of 
change (uniqueness of imagined future scene, amount of
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change from past scene, and degree of i m p r ovement from past 
scene) which subjects were asked to rate in various 
Categories (image as a whole, imagined emotions, imagined 
behaviors, and imagined cognitions). A highly significant 
main effect for Change-Factor (JF(2, 336) = 26.9, jo <( .001) 
and a significant Change-Factor X Category interaction (.F(6, 
336) = 3,51, jd <  .01) were obtained. The interaction is 
illustrated in Figure 2. The main effect is accounted for 
by subjects, regardless of mood, giving largest ratings for 
degree of improvement, smallest ratings for uniqueness, and 
intermediate ratings for amount of change. The interaction 
occurred because subjects imagined more change, but less 
uniqueness, for future actions than for other Categories. 
Neuman-Keuls tests indicated that Category means did not 
differ significantly for any given Change-Factor. No a 
priori predictions were made with regard to relationships 
among Categories and Change-Factors, and these findings do 
not bear significantly on the experimental hypotheses. Some 
implications of the high ratings for impr o v e m e n t  will be 
discussed in Chapter 4.
A significant Sex of Subjects X Category interaction 
w a s  al s o  o b t a i n e d  (f^(3, 168) = 3.73, j3 .05; see F i g u r e  3). 
Male subjects tended to give higher ratings of change 
(across all three Change-Factors) in the Categories of image 
as a whole, imagined emotions, and imagined cognitions, but' 
lower ratings of change than female subjects in the Category
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of imagined behaviors. Neuman-Keuls tests indicated that
t
means for any given Category did not differ significantly 
between sexes.
Finally, the Mood X Sex of Subjects interaction 
approached statistical significance (£(1, 56) = 3.88, j)
0.10; see Figure 4). In this interaction male subjects 
rated comparable amounts of change (as measured across all 
Categories and Change-Factors) in both the Dysphoric and 
Elated conditions, while female subjects rated amounts of 
change comparable to male subjects in the Elated condition, 
but rated less change in the Dysphoric condition. It 
appears that female subjects responded differentially in the 
Elated and Dysphoric groups, and in the predicted direction, 
on an overall measure of imagined change, while male 
subjects did not respond differentially in different mood 
groups. This sex-of-subjects effect was not anticipated.
In considering the results of the factroial ANOVA, it 
should be noted that they are necessarily suspect because of 
non-random assignment of some subjects and small sample 
size.
CHAPTER FOUR 
DISCUSSION
Review of Hypotheses
It may be h e l p f u l  to b r i e f l y  r e v i e w  the basic 
experimental hypotheses and some related terminology before 
examining the results of the study and their implications.
The intent of this study was to demonstrate that subjects in 
a dysphoric mood would imagine future scenes that were 
comparable to and little changed from currently recalled 
dysphoric past scenes, while subjects in an elated mood 
would imagine future scenes which differed considerably from 
elated past scenes. To state it more simply, it was 
anticipated that elated subjects would imagine more 
creative, original future scenes than dysphoric subjects.
The Future Change Questionnaire (FCQ) was developed to 
explore this hypothesis. The FCQ examined three aspects of 
change and originality: uniqueness, change, and improvement. 
These aspects are referred to as Change-Factors. Each 
Change-Factor was applied to four different aspects of the 
imagined future scene, referred to as Categories, which 
were: the image as a whole, imagined emotions, imagined 
behaviors, and imagined cognitions. It was specifically
Jhypothesized that elated subjects would rate more change for 
all Change-Factors and for all Categories than would 
dysphoric subjects. It was specifically hypothesized that 
elated subjects would have a higher Total Change score, that
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is a sum of all c h a n g e  s c o r e s  for all C a t e g o r i e s  and C h a n g e -  
Factors, than would dysphoric subjects. Finally, it was 
hypothesized that, if given a choice, elated subjects would 
c h o o s e  to i m a g i n e  s c e n e s  at a t i m e  m o r e  d i s t a n t  in the 
future (referred to as Time Projection) than would dysphoric 
s u b j e c t s .
Review of Experimental Findings
Final analysis of the data was complicated by the fact 
that 16 of 49 subjects in the Dysphoric group unexpectedly 
elevated their mood to levels co mparable to the Elated group 
when they imagined the future. These subjects' scores .on 
the FCQ tend to be artificially high due to the nature of 
the FCQ questions, so their FCQ scores will receive little 
discussion. Possible reasons for these subjects' failure to 
hold the dysphoric mood will be discussed, however.
Basic Hypotheses. In general, the hypotheses that 
Elated subjects would rate their imagined future scenes as 
more unique, more changed, and more improved than Dysphoric 
subjects received weak support at best. In only one case 
did the difference between Elated and Dysphoric subjects' 
responses to an FCQ item attain statistical significance. 
Elated subjects did rate significantly more improvement in 
imagined future cognitons than Dysphoric subjects, and 
significance was preserved under transformation by image 
clarity and by image'intensity. Seven of the 12 FCQ change 
items showed weak, nonsignificant trends in the predicted
61
direction. These were uniqueness, change, and i m p r ovement  
of the image as a whole; uniqueness and i m p r ovement of 
imagined emotions; uniqueness of imagnined behaviors; and 
uniqueness and improvement of imagined cognitions. Four of 
the FCQ items showed trends opposite to the predicted 
direction (change in imagined emotions, change in imagined 
behaviors, improvement in imagi ned behaviors, and change in 
imagined cognitions). All trends were essentially, unchanged 
when the data were transformed by multi plication by image 
clarity or image intensity. Similarly, the hypotheses that 
Elated subjects would have higher Total Change Scores than 
Dysphoric subjects received only weak support, in that 
Elated subjects* Total Change scores were only 
nonsignificantly higher than those of Dysphoric subjects. 
This trend was also preserved under transformation by image 
clarity and image intensity. Finally, the prediction that 
Dysphoric subjects would choose to imagine scenes less 
distant in the future than would Elated subjects was not 
supported. On the average, Dysphoric subjects chose to 
imagine nonsignificantly more distant future scenes than 
Elated subjects. This contradicts a finding by Yufit, 
Benzies, Fonte, and Fawcett (1970) in which clinically 
depressed subjects chose to imagine less distant future 
scenes than control subjects.
H o o d Shift i n the Dy s-Sl Group. A m a j o r  p r o b l e m  in the 
study was the unanticipated loss of 16 subjects from the
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Dysphoric group. These subjects received, and apparently 
responded to, the Dysphoric mood induction, but when they 
were asked to imagine a future scene they reported 
significant increases in mood. The increases occurred in 
spite of repeated verbal and written instructions to the 
subjects to hold their mood at the same level throughout the 
study. Examination of the data indicated that these 
subjects did not differ significantly from other subjects 
receiving the Dysphoric mood induction in their responses to 
the social desirability scale, the Dysphoric mood induction, 
or in rating the intensity and clarity of their images. It 
was informally observed that failure to hold the Dysphoric 
mood occurred regularly throughout the study, and was not 
confined to one or two groups of subjects receiving the 
Dysphoric mood induction. (Examination of the post- 
experimental questionnaire indicated that most subjects, 
regardless of mood group, reported being able to understand 
and comply with directions.)
Two pilot studies were conducted prior to collecting 
this data, and the y p r o v i d e  a clue as to w h y  s o m e  s u b j e c t s  
failed to hold the Dysphoric mood. In the original pilot 
study no time frame was set for subjects' imagined future 
scenes. Subjects were simply instructed to choose a time in 
the future and imagine a scene while holding the Dysphoric 
or Elated mood. All 10 of the subjects in the Dysphoric 
group held the Dysphoric mood. However, in' order to further
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standardize comparisons among subjects imagined future 
scenes, it was decided to impose a standard time frame.
This was arbitrarily set at one year in the future. A 
second pilot study was conducted using using a s m a l l  number 
of s u b j e c t s  and the i m p o s e d  t i m e  fram e. Of six s u b j e c t s  in 
the Dysphoric group, one failed to hold the Dysphoric mood 
while imagining the future. This isolated case was 
dismissed as an anoinoly. While the small numbers of *
subjects used in both pilot studies make it impossible to 
reach a definite conclusion, it is plausible that imposition 
of a one year time frame contributed to subjects' failure 
to hold the Dysphoric mood.
One possible explantion of why a one year time frame 
might interfere with holding the Dysphoric mood lies in the 
nature of the mood induction. In order to induce a 
dysphoric mood, subjects were asked to recall a sad past 
experience. The sad feelings from this experience may well 
have had a duration of less than one year. When subjects 
w e r e  a s k e d  to p r o j e c t  one yea r into the f u t u r e  they m i g h t  
simply have extended their images past the phenomenological 
limits of the dysphoric feelings. This explanation does 
not, however, account for the elevation of subjects' mood to 
levels comparable to that of the Elated subjects.
A second explanation of subjects' failure to hold the 
Dysphoric mood may be that subjects regularly use imagining 
the future as a way of relieving or escaping dysphoric
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feelings. In this context it is worth noting that even some 
subjects who held the Dysphoric mood chose to imagine 
positive, happy future scenes. Also recall that of the 
three Change-Factors, imp r o v e m e n t  received the highest 
ratings across both moods and across all four Categories 
(see Figure 2). There appeared to be a strong tendancy for 
subjects to imagine improved future scenes. It should be 
noted that imagining the future resulted in small overall 
increases in mood for both the Dysphoric and the Elated 
groups. While this explanation does not rely on the 
i m p o s i t i o n  of a one year t i m e  frame, it can a c c o u n t  for the 
changes which an imposed time frame might cause. If 
subjects use imagining the future to escape from unhappy 
feelings in the present, then the more distant time one 
imagines, the more one removes oneself from the unpleasant 
emotions. Subjects who are instructed to hold their mood 
and imagine a nonspecific time in the future may be more 
likely to choose a time frame which will allow them to 
comply with the direction to hold the mood. Subjects 
directed to imagine a specific time may have more difficulty 
complying with the direction to hold their mood because the 
time frame may be too far removed from the dysphoric 
feelings.
The possibility that subjects use imagining the future 
to relieve negative feelings may also partially explain why 
subjects in the Dysphoric group chose longer time
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projections than subjects in the Elated group. The wording 
of the instruction to the subjects was, "Choose a time in 
the future that you would like to imagine." Use of the word 
"like" may have caused Dysphoric subjects to choose times 
which were more distant in order to escape from their 
dysphoric feelings.
A final possible explanation for subjects failure to 
hold the Dysphoric mood is that some subjects may have 
assumed that the object of the experiment was to demonstrate 
that imagining the future raised s u bjects’ mood, and that 
these subjects were trying to help out the experimenter by 
confirming that hypothesis. Chile this explanation cannot 
be eliminated, it seems unlikely. Subjects were repeatedly 
told to hold t h e i r  m o o d  at a g i v e n  level, and it s e e m s  
likely that subjects who attempting to be compliant would 
have followed these instructions.
Results of the Factorial Analysis of Variance. The 
results of the factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA) are 
necessarily suspect due to the small number of subjects and 
nonrandom selection of Dysphoric female subjects. The ANOVA 
was performed as an ancillary, exploratory analysis. No 
predictions were made regarding the specific levels of 
Change-Factor, Category, or the interaction between these 
variables, but the findings involving them will be 
discussed. Although no differences due to sex of subjects 
were anticipated, this varaiable also proved to be of some
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i n t e r e s t .
In general, regardless of mood, subjects rated 
considerable improvement in their future scenes. (The mean 
i mprovement rating for the factorial ANOVA sample was 65% of 
full scale). Subjects rated a moderate amount of change 
(54% of full scale) and a smaller amount of uniqueness (37% 
of full scale). Although Elated subjects' ratings of 
improvement did not differ significantly from those of 
Dysphoric subjects, inspection of data from the four 
improvement items of the FCQ reveals that Elated subjects 
ratings of improvement were higher for three of the four 
Categories. Thus, previous findings that depressed subjects 
make less optimtistic predictions about the future than 
nondepressed subjects (e.g. Alloy & Abramson, 1979) are not 
necessarily contradicted. On the other hand, induced 
dysphoria failed to produce the anticipated result, which 
was that Dysphoric subjects would imagine future scenes 
which showed little or no improvement or change. I suspect 
that this occurred because the relatively mild dysphoric 
state produced by the mood induction failed to overcome 
subjects' tendancies to imagine positive futures.
Both the Change-Factor X Category and the Sex of 
Subjects X Category interactions involved subjects rating 
change in the Category of imagined future behaviors 
differently from other Categories. Subjects tended to rate 
imagined future behaviors as showing more change, but less
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uniqueness, than imagined future emotions, cognitions, or 
than the imagined future scene as a whole. Furthermore, 
female subjects tended to rate imagined behaviors as showing 
more change across Change-Factors than the other three 
Categories, while male subjects tended to rate imagined 
future behaviors as showing less change than the other three 
Categories (see Figure 3). One possible explanation for the 
different ratings of imagined future behaviors is that, 
imagined future behavior is less mood dependent than 
cognitions or than the image as a whole. (It seems 
reasonable that imagined future emotions are likely to be 
highly mood-dependent.) Imagined future behavior appears to 
be more mood-dependent for males than for females.
However, the above explanation may have to be modified 
given the near-significant Hood X Sex of Subjects 
interaction. This interaction suggests that male subjects 
do not rate future scenes differently in different mood 
states, while female subjects do. The interaction was 
unexpected, and may represent a tendancy for male subjects 
to deny n e g a t i v e  e m o t i o n s  or to be les s w i l l i n g  to deal w i t h  
negative feelings than female subjects. The Mood x Sex of 
Subjects X Category interaction may have failed to reach 
statistical signifcance due to large response variability 
and small number of subjects. Future studies will need to 
examine the sex of subjects variable more carefully.
Conclusion
Although this study failed to find significant support 
for the hypothesis that Dysphoric subjects imagine future 
scenes that resemble the present more than the future scenes 
imagined by Elated subjects, the study did demonstrate the 
potential importance of future imagery as a mood elevator. 
Some Dysphoric subjects spontaneously and significantly 
elevated their moods by imagining positive future scenes. 
Other Dysphoric subjects who imagined positive future scenes 
did not report significant mood elevation, but might have 
be e n  ab l e  to ra i s e  their m o o d  had they not been c o m p l y i n g  
with directions to maintain it at a constant level.
Imagining the future produced slight increases in mood 
ratings for both the Dysphoric and Elated mood groups. 
Moreover, improvement from the past scene was the highest 
rated Change-Factor for both mood groups. While the 
increase in mood for the Dysphoric group might be explained 
as a r e g r e s s i o n  t o w a r d  a m o r e  n e u t r a l  m o o d  state, thi s is 
not the case for the Elated mood group. Lazarus (1968) has 
reported similar increases in mood induced by imagining 
positive future scenes in the treatment of individual cases 
of acute depression. A fruitful line of research might be 
to.compare the use of positive future imagery, positive 
present imagery, and positive past imagery as treatments for
■ in     «K. M... M.I
dysphoria. It might also be interesting to determine to 
what degree individuals spontaneously use positive future
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imagery to raise their mood, especially in light of current 
research on cognitive style as a risk factor in depression 
(e.g. P e t e r s o n  & S e l i g m a n ,  1984).
It has been adequately documented that depressed 
individuals have negative views of the future (e.g. Beck, 
1967; Fibel & Hale, 1978; Layne, Lefton, Walters, & Merry, 
1983; Linden, Hautzinger, & Hoffman, 1983). The intent of 
this study was to demonstrate that not only are depressives* 
expectations of the future n e g a t i v e , but that they strongly 
resemble depressives* perceptions of the present. Due to a 
variety of methodological problems, it was not possible to 
make such a de monstration or to reject the original 
hypothesis. I think that the methodological difficulties 
precluded an adequate test of the experimental hypotheses, 
and that further research is merited. Future research in 
this area could proceed along at least three lines. First, 
the present study could be repeated without the time 
constraint on future imagery. This study would also be 
useful in determining whether or not the time constraint 
played a role in subjects' failure to hold the Dysphoric 
mood. Second, correlational studies could examine the 
relationship between perception of future change and various 
measures of depression and hopelessness. Finally, 
perception of future change could be assessed in depressed 
and nondepressed psychiatric populations to dete rmine if it 
is useful in differentiating between these two groups.
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Emotions and Images Study 
This study is designed to find out how our moods relate 
to our imaginations. We will be asking you to relive 
situations in which you felt strong emotions. You will be 
asked to close your eyes and to imagine and elaborate the 
scenes in great detail. Then you will be asked to imagine 
another scene in the future. After imagining this scene you 
will be asked to rate the strength of your emotions and to 
answer some questions about what you imagined.
Some of the instructions you hear will be tape 
recorded. This is to help us maintain standard conditions 
across all our experimental groups. Please pay attention to 
these instructions just as you wold pay attention to a live 
experimenter. Also, be sure to follow the directions at the 
bottom of each page. In order to gain maximum personal 
benefit from this study, it will be important for you to 
allow yourself to feel just as you did in the original 
situation from the past. » e hope you will find this study 
an experience which helps you to know yourself just a bit 
better. Although we will ask you to experience some 
powerful feelings, every effort will be made to ensure that 
you feel relaxed and good at the conclusion ot the 
experiment. Any information you give us will be kept 
confidential.. There is no deception involved in this study.
PLEASE TUiv.'i PALE 
***Say "please answer the questions on the next 3 pages."
so
In order to help us to understand you a little better, please
answer the following questions,
*** Crowne-Marlowe Social Desirability Scale ***
T F 1, Before voting I thoroughly Investigate the 
qualifications of all of the candidates.
T F 2, I never hesitate to go out of my way to help 
someone in trouble.
T F 3. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work
if I am not emcouraged.
T F 4. I have never intensely disliked anyone.
T F 5. On occasions 1 have had doubts about ray ability to
succeed in life.
T F 6, I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my
way.
T F 7, I am always careful about my manner of dress.
T F 8. My table manners at home are as 3 o o d as when I eat
out in a restaurant.
T F 9, If I could get into a movie without paying and be 
sure I was not seen I would probably do it.
T r 10. On a few occasions, I have given up something
because I thought too little of my ability.
T F 11. I like to gossip at times.
T F 12. There have been times when I felt like
rebelling against people in authority even though I 
knew they were right.
T F 13. No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good
listener.
TURN PAGE AND CONTINUE
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T r 14. I can remember "playing sick" to get out of 
something.
T F 15. There have been occasions when I have taken
advantage of someone.
T F 16. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a
mistake.
T F 17. I always try to practice what 1 preach.
T F 18. I don't find it particularly difficult to get 
along with loudmouthed, obnoxious people,
T F 19. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive 
and forget.
T F 20, When I don't know something I don't mind at all 
admitting it.
T I- 21. I am always courceous, even to people who are 
disagreeable.
T F 22. At times I have really insisted on having things
my way.
T F 23. There have been occasions when I felt like 
smashing things.
I F 24. I would never think of letting someone else be 
punished for ray wrong-doings.
T F 25. I never resented being asked to return a favor.
T F 26. I have never been irked when people expressed 
ideas very different from ny own.
T F 27. I never make a long trip without checking the 
safety of my car.
'T'Jkk PAGZ AGO CONTIGUZ
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T r 23. There have been times when I was quite jealous of
the good fortune of others.
T r 29. X have almost never felt the urge to tell someone
off.
T F 30. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors 
of me.
T F 31. I have never felt that I was punished without 
cause.
T r 32. X sometimes think that when people have a 
misfortune they only got what they deserved.
T F 33. I have never deliberately said something that 
hurt someone's feelings.
CONTINUE TO iIOLD YuUK MOOD.
UO NOT TURN PAGE UNTIL ASKED TO DO SO.
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“ '♦Play relaxation instructions anil mood induction now.
. Iloe to Relax
In order to help you use your imagination more clearly, I am 
going to help you to relax. Assume the most comfortable position 
you can. Close your eyes, relax, and listen to my voice. . .
AFTER YOU OPEN YOUR EYES AGAIN, PLEASE TURN THE PAGE
Carefully mark on the scale below how you feel right now. 
Continue to hold your mood at this level to the best of your 
ability.
*** Mood Assessment Scale ***
the most sadness no sadness the most happiness
you can Imagine or happiness you can imagine
Write down two or three sentences describing the scene that you 
imagined to change your mood._______________________________________
Please hold your mood exactly where it is now. If at any tine 
you need to, review what you have written above and re-imagine 
the scene to help you hold your mood, holding this mood may be 
difficult, but it is important that you do hold your mood as best 
you can.
PLEASE TUKN THE PALE
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As quickly as you can, choose a tine in your future that you 
would like to imagine. This may be days, weeks, months, or years 
into the future. Please indicate when this time will be by 
placing a number in the appropriate space (e.g 3J5 years).
* * *  Time Projection Item ***
______  Days _______  Weeks   Months   Years
STOP HERE 
CONTINUE TO HOLD YOUR MOOD 
YOU MAY WISH TO RE-IMAGINE THE SCENE YOU USED TO CHANGE YOUR MOOD 
AT THIS TIME. DO NOT TURN THE PAGE UNTIL ASKED TO DO SO.
***When everyone has finished, "Please turn to the next page 
in your booklet and follow along with me."
(JO
you will now be asked Co imagine a time in your future. We will 
help you to do this more clearly. It will help us if everyone 
imagines something at about the same time in the future, so we 
have arbitrarily chosen one year from now. Ue will also ask you 
to answer some questions about what you imagine. These questions 
may seem repetitious, but please pay attention to each and every 
question and try to answer all of them as honestly and correctly 
as possible. You need not spend very much time on any one 
question, just mark the best answer you can. We need your best 
effort for this experiment to be a success. Also, when we ask 
you to hold your mood, please do this to the best of your 
abi111y.
*#*Play imagery instructions here.
Future Scene
As you continue to hold your mood, 1 want you to imagine 
what your future will be like one year from now. What you 
imagine can be as realistic or as unlikely as you choose, but be 
sure to continue to hold your mood. In order to help you hold 
your mood, you may wish to re-imaglne the scene from the past 
that you used to help change your mood. For some of you it may 
be helpful to structure your imagined future scene around some 
object or event from the past scene. Others may prefer to 
imagine something completely different. Do whatever works best 
for you. Holding you mood while imagining the future may be 
difficult, but it is important that you do hold your mood to the 
best of your ability. What you imagine does not have to be
TURN PAGE
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realistic, but it should take place aout one year into the 
future. Take a moment to make your mood intense by re-imagining 
your past scene. Now close your eyes and listen to my voice.
AFTER YOU OPEN YOUR EYES AGAIN, PLEASE TURN THE PAGE AND ANSWER 
THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS.
As you continue to maintain your mood, hold the scene in 
your imaglnaton as clearly as you can. Write down two or three 
short sentences describing what you are imagining in the space 
provided.
Describe your image here
Carefully mark on the scale below how you feel right now.
the most sadness no sadness the most happienes
you can imagine or happiness you can imagine
CONTINUE TO HOLD YOUR HOOD 
WHEN YOU HAVE COHPLETED THIS PAGE, PLEASE TURN' TO THE HEAT ONE 
AND CONTINUE.
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*** Future Change Questionnaire ***
Please answer each question by carefully narking the scale below 
it at the point that you feel is correct for you. The following 
questions refer to everything that you are imagining about the 
future, including feelings, actions, and thoughts.
1. How unique or unusual is the scene you are imagining now?
totally totally
unique ordinary
2. Compared to che scene that you imagined to change your mood.
how much is what you are imagining different from the way your
life was going at that time?
identical very much
dif ferent
3. Compared to the scene that you imagined to change your mood, 
how much is what you are imagining better or worse than your life 
was then?
very much very much
worse better
HOLD YClUX .-100D, TURN THE PAGE, AND CONTINUE
so
The following questions refer to to emotions you imagined 
yourself experiencing, feelings like joy, sorrow, disappointment, 
or satisfaction.
4. How unusual or unique is what you imagine yourself feeling in 
your future scene?
totally totally
ordinary unique
5. Compared to hte scene that you imagined to change your mood,
how much is what you are imagining yourself feeling the same as
the way you felt at that time?
totally identical
different
0. Compared to the scene that you imagined to change your mood, 
how mucn better or worse is what you are imagining yourself 
feelin; than the way you felt then?
I_____________ ;_______________________________I
very much very much
better worse
HOLD YOUR MOOD, TURN THE PAGE, AND CONTINUE
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The following questions refer to your actions In the scene you 
are imagining, whatever it is that you imagine yourself doing or 
however you are acting.
7. How unusual or unique is what you are imagining yourself doing 
in your future scene?
I______________ ._______________ _ l
totally totally
ordinary unique
8. Compared to the scene that you imagined to change your mood, 
how much is what you are imagining yourself doing the same as 
what you were doing at that time?
I______________________________ ________  I
just the same totally
different
9. Compared to the scene that you imagined to change your mood, 
how much is what you are imagining yourself doing better or worse 
than what you were doing at that time? (Better or worse refers
to things like more or less successful or competent.)
very much very much
worse better
HOLD YOUR HOOD, TURN THE PAGE, AND CONTINUE
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The following questions refer to things jrou might find yourself 
thinking if you were in your imagined scene.
10. How unusual or unique is what you might be thinking in your 
imagined future scene?
I_____________________________________________I
totally totally
unique ordinary
11. Compared to the scene that you imagined to change your mood,
how much is what you might be thinking in your imagined future 
scene like something you would have been thinking at that past 
time?
I_____________________________________________I
very much very much
like different
12. Compared to the scene that you imagined to change your mood,
how much is what you might be thinking in your imagined future 
scene better or worse than what you were thinking at that time in 
the past?
very much very much
better worse
The following questions refer to your image as a whole.
13. how clearly were you able to experience your image?
not clearly just like
at all real life
HOLD YOUR MOOD, TURN THE PAGE, AND CONTINUE
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14. How intense were the feelings you experienced in your image?
hardly felt extremely
anything intense
Please briefly describe a few of the important similarities (if
any) between your future image and the scene you imagined to
change your mood.
Please brifly describe a few of the important differences (if 
any) between your future scene and the scene you imagined to 
change your mood.
When you have completed the questions, feel free to stretch and 
relax quietly.
PLEASE DO HOT TUP.:.' PAGE UNTIL ASKED TO DO SO 
***Play mood adjustments when everyone has finished.
YuU CO HOT HEED TO HOLD YOUS MOOD ANY LONGER
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***Say "Turn the page and answer the rest of the questions."
In order to help us with future research, please answer the
following questions. Where appropriate, please circle the number
which best represents how you feel.
1. I was able to understand the directions as they were given.
0 1 2 3 4
strongly strongly
agree disagree
2. Please describe which directions you found hardest to follow.
3. I was able to do what was asked most or all of the tine.
0 1 2  3 4
strongly strongly
agree disagree
4. Please describe which parts of the experiment you were unable 
to do as asked.
3. The relaxation instructions helped me to relax.
0 1 2 3 4
strongly strongly
agree disagree
6. What kind of instructions aight nave worked better?
7, When you were asked to remember a tine in your past and 
change your nood, how did it make you feel?
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8. Which of the questions or statements helped you the aost 
to change your mood?
9. What kind of statements or questions might have helped 
more?
10. I was able to hold the mood at the same level while I 
imagined the future.
1
strongly
agree
strongly
disagree
11. 1 was able to hold the mood at the same level while I
answered the questions.
1
strongly
agree
12. I was able to understand the questions.
1
strongly
agree
strongly
disagree
strongly
disagree
13. Which questions were hardest to understand?
14. I feel at least as good now as I did at the beginning of the 
ex perioent.
0 1 2  3 4
strongly strongly
agree disagree
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You have now completed your part of the study. Thank you 
very much for your cooperation. Since this Is an ongoing project 
we would appreciate it if you would not discuss the details of 
what went on here. If you do not feel at least as happy and 
relaxed as you did when you came in you may have done an 
especially good job of imagining. Please remain here until you 
feel comfortable enough to leave. We will be happy to discuss 
your experience with you, or to just sit quietly until you are 
ready to leave. Otherwise, you may now go. Leave your booklet with 
the experimenter on the way out. If you would like to receive a 
written summary of the purpose and results of this experiment, 
please leave your name and address with the experimenter.
APPENDIX B 
CEOW.VE-itARLOW’E SOCIAL DESIRAGLITY SCALE
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T F 1. Before voting I thoroughly investigate the
qualifications of all of the candidates.
T F 2. I never hesitate to go out of njr way to help
sooeone in trouble.
T F 3. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work
if I am not emcouraged.
T F 4. I have never intensely disliked anyone.
T F 5. On occasions I have had doubts about my ability to
succeed in life.
T F 6. I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my
way.
T F 7. I am always careful about my manner of dress.
T F 8. iiy table manners at home are as good as when I eat
out in a restaurant.
T F 9. If I could get into a movie without paying and be
sure I was not seen I would probably do it.
T F 10. On a few occasions, I have given up something
because I thought too little of my ability.
T F 11. I like to gossip at times.
T F 12. There have been times when I felt like
rebelling against people in authority even though I 
knew they were right.
T F 13. No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good
listener.
T F 14. I can remember "playing sick" to get out of
something.
T F 13. There have been occasions when I have taken
advantage of someone.
9V
T F 16. I'd always willing to admit it when I make a
mistake.
T F 17. I always try to practice what I preach.
T F 18. I don't find it particularly difficult to get
along with loudmouthed, obnoxious people.
T F 19. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive
and forget.
T F 20. When I don't know something I don't mind at all
admitting it.
T ? 21. I am always courteous, even to people who are
di sagreeable.
T F 22. At times I have really insisted on having tilings 
my way.
T r 23. There have been occasions wnen 1 felt like
smashing things.
T F 24. I would never think of letting someone else be
punished for my wrong-doings.
T F 25. I never resented being asked to return a favor.
T F 26. I have never been irked when people expressed
ideas very different from my own.
T F 27. I never make a long trip without checking the
safety of my car.
T F 2d. There have been times w.len I was quite jealous of
the good fortune of others.
T F 29. I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone
of f.
I V 30. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors 
of me.
too
T F 31. 1 have never felt that 1 was punished without
cause.
T F 32. I sometimes think that when people have a
misfortune they only got what they deserved.
T F 33. I have never deliberately said something that
hurt someone's feelings
(Reduced from original size for binding)
APPENDIX C 
FUTURE CHANGE QUESTIONNAIRE 
Please answer each question by carefully marking the scale below 
it at the point that you feel is correct for you. The following 
questions refer to everything that you are imagining about the 
future, including feelings, actions, and thoughts.
1. How unique or unusual is the scene you are imagining now?
totally totally.
unique ordinary
2. Compared to the scene that you imagined to change your mood.
how much is what you are imagining different from the wav vour
life was going at that time?
1 1
identical very much
different
3. Compared to the scene that you imagined to change your mood,
how much is what you are imagining better or worse than vour life
was then?
very ouch very much
worse better
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The following questions refer to to emotions you Imagined 
yourself experiencing, feelings like joy, sorrow, disappointment, 
or satisfaction.
4. How unusual or unique is what you imagine yourself feeling in 
your future scene?
I_____________________________________________I
totally totally
ordinary unique
5. Compared to hte scene that you imagined to change your mood, 
how much is what you are imagining yourself feeling the same as 
the way you felt at that time?
totally identical
different
6. Compared to the scene that you imagined to change your mood, 
how much better or worse is what you are imagining yourself 
feeling than the way you felt then?
very much very much
better worse
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The following questions refer to your actions In the scene you 
are Imagining, whatever it Is that you Imagine yourself doing or 
however you are acting.
7. How unusual or unique is what you are Imagining yourself doing 
in your future scene?
totally totally
ordinary unique
3. Compared to the scene that you Imagined to change your mood,
how much is what you are imagining yourself doing the same as
what you were doing at that time?
just the same totally
9, Compared to the scene that you imagined to change your mood, 
how much is whac you are imagining yourself doing better or worse 
than what you were doing at that time? (Better or worse refers 
to things like more or less successful or competent.)
The following questions refer to things you might find yourself 
thinking if you were in your imagined scene.
10. how unusual or unique is what you might be thinking in your 
imagined future scene?
different
very much 
worse
very much 
better
totally
unique
totally
ordinary
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11. Compared Co the scene that you Imagined to change your mood, 
how much is what you might be thinking in your Imagined future 
scene like something you would have been thinking at that past 
time?
I_____________________________________________I
very much very much
like different
12. Compared to the scene that you imagined to change your mood, 
how much is what you might be thinking in your imagined future 
scene better or worse than what you were thinking at rhat time in 
the past?
very much 
better
very much 
worse
The following questions refer to your image as a whole.
13. iiow clearly were you
i
able to experience your image ?
1
not clearly 
at all
just like 
real life
14. How intense were the
1
feelings you experienced in your image?
1
hardly felt 
anything
extrenely
incense
APPENDIX D 
RELAXATION INST R U C T 1 0 N S 
"In order to let you use your imagination more clearly, 
I am go i n g  to help you to relax. A s s u m e  the m o s t  
comfortable position you can. Close your eyes, relax, and 
l i s t e n  to my voice..."
I m a g i n e  y o u r s e l f  f l o a t i n g  on a soft cloud and f e e l i n g  very 
comfortable.
You are beginning to feel calm and peaceful.
You are floating smoothly.
You feel calm and safe.
Slowly breathe in a deep, refreshing breath and hold it in 
for a few seconds...
( L e a v e  7 to 10 s e c o n d s  b e t w e e n  i n h a l a t i o n s  and 
e x h a l a t i o n s .)
E x h a l e  slowly...
We will do this breathing exercise ten more times.
One - b r e a t h e  in...
Breathe out slowly...
Feel the muscles of your face relax and go slack.
Two - breathe in deeply...
Try to b r e a t h e  in such a way that your a b d o m e n  fi l l s  w i t h  
air but your chest moves only a little.
As you e x h a l e  f r o m  the a b d o m e n ,  feel the m u s c l e s  of your 
neck and shoulders relax.
Three - breathe in slowly...
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As you exhale, feel the m u s c l e s  in your a r m s  l o o s e n  and 
r e l a x .
Four - b r e a t h e  in...
You are becoming more and more relaxed.
As you exhale, feel the m u s c l e s  in your c h e s t  and a b d o m e n  
l o o s e n .
Five - b r e a t h e  in...
Exhale slowly and feel the muscles in your legs relax.
Six - breathe in another slow, refreshing breath...
As you exhale, feel your whole body becoming limp.
Se v e n  - b r e a t h  in...
As you exhale, feel your w o r r i e s  f l o w i n g  out of you w i t h  
your breath.
You are now floating easily and calmly.
Eight - Breathe in deeply...
Exhale slowly.
You are feeling very relaxed, all your muscle tension is gone. 
Nine - Breathe in...
Exhale slowly.
You feel relaxed, calm, safe.
Ten - Breathe in...
Exhale slowly, peacefully.
Continue to breathe slowly and deeply."
APPENDIX E 
DYSPHORIC MOOD INDUCTION 
"Now, as you continue to breathe slowly and deeply, I 
am go i n g  to help you to c h a n g e  your mood. T h i n k  of a t i m e  
in your life when you felt very sad and depressed. Try to 
r e member particular a time when you felt very sad and 
depressed. I will pause now for you to think of a specific 
time. (Pause at least 90 seconds for response.) Now I am 
going to help you relive that experience, and re-experience 
the feeling of sadness. You won't have to stay sad for very 
long, and later I'll help you to raise your mood.
S o m e  of the t h i n g s  I say m i g h t  not be e x a c t l y  w h a t  you 
experienced in the situation, but that won't bother you or 
break your concentration in rem e m b e r i n g  the situation and 
the feelings you experienced. You will find that you can 
respond to the things I say that were true in the sitaution, 
and w h a t  is not true w i l l  not c h a n g e  your mood. You w i l l  be 
fully able to experience the sadness or depression that you 
felt at that time. If, as you become sad, you think of a 
situation in which you felt sadder or more depressed and you 
want to use that situation instead, go ahead and do that." 
"Begin to visualize your scene now...
Look around you, what do you see?
Look closely at the scene and take in all the details.
hat's happening?
Uhat's happening to you?
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Start feeling how it is to be there.
Is there anyone with you?
What are they doing?
Is there something they've done to make you feel as you do?
Is th e r e  s o m e t h i n g  you see in t h e m  that is h u r t i n g  you and
making you sad?
As you look around and begin to feel how it is to be there, 
just let those feelings begin to grow.
Let t h e m  g r o w  s t r o n g e r ,  just like they w e r e  at the time.
As I continue to talk you'll find yourself feeling more sad 
and unhappy.
You can feel the tension in your body.
You might be feeling anxious and uptight, and not be sure
'why .
Perhaps you're struggling to keep back tears.
The feelings are getting stronger and stronger now.
The sadness feels as if it is all through your body now.
As you're there in that situation, the sadness is becoming 
deeper and deeper.
Your body feels edgy, but you feel so tired too, dull and 
t i r e d .
You feel as if you've got no energy.
You don't feel like doing anything.
You can feel the hollowness o f e v r y t h i n g .
You feel sadder and sadder, more and more depressed."
"Now I w a n t  you to a d j u s t  your m o o d  so that it is
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intense, and you feel very sad and depressed, but it is not 
unbearable. Adjust your mood so that it is intense, but not 
unbearable, so that you still feel in control but the sad 
m o o d  is intense. You ma y  have to r a i s e  or l o w e r  your m o o d  
to make it intense, but not unbearable. I am going to ask 
you to feel intense and sad again. Try to keep the feeling 
exactly as it is now."
APPENDIX F 
ELATED MOOD INDUCTION 
"Now, as you continue to breathe slowly and deeply, I 
am going to help you to c h a n g e  your mood. T h i n k  of a t i m e  
in your life when you felt very happy and joyful. Try to 
remember a partcular time when you felt very happy and 
joyful. I will pause now for you to think of a specific 
time. (Pause at least 90 seconds for response.) Now I am 
going to help you relive that experience, and re-experience 
the feeling of happiness. You can stay happy if you want 
to, or later I’ll help you to change your mood to something 
m o r e relaxed.
S o m e  of the t h i n g s  I say m i g h t  not be e x a c t l y  wh a t  you 
experienced in the situation, but that won't bother you or 
break your concentration in remembering the situation and 
the feelings you experienced. You will find that you can 
respond to the things I say that were true in the sitaution, 
and w h a t  is not true w i l l  not c h a n g e  your mood. You w i l l  be 
fully able to experience the happiness or joy that you felt 
at that time. If, as you become happy, you think of a 
situation in which you felt happier or more joyful and you 
want to use that situation instead, go ahead and do that." 
"Begin to visualize your scene now...
Look around you, what do you see?
Look closely at the scene and take in all the details.
V/ hat's happening?
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What's happening to you?
Start feeling how it is to be there.
Is there anyone with you?
What are they doing?
Is there something they've, done to make you feel as you do?
Is there s o m e t h i n g  you see in t h e m  that is c h e e r i n g  you and
making you happy?
As you look around and begin to feel how it is to be there, 
just let those feelings begin to grow.
Let t h e m  g r o w  s t r onger, just like they w e r e  at the time.
Let the happy feelings spread through your body.
As I continue to talk you'll find yourself feeling more warm 
and joyful.
Perhaps you can feel a tingling in your body.
You m i g h t  be f e e l i n g  light and exc i t e d ,  but m i g h t  not be 
sure why.
Perhaps you're struggling to keep back a chuckle.
The feelings are getting stronger and stronger now, just let 
them grow.
The happiness feels as if it is all through your body now.
As you're there in that situation, the happiness is becoming 
stronger and stronger.
Your body feels light. You might feel excited and 
e n e r g e t i c .
You feel as if you're full of energy.
You feel light, excited, like you could do anything.
You can feel the excitement of everything.
Let the feelings grow stronger and stronger.
You feel happier and happier, more and more joyful."
"Now I w a n t  you to a d j u s t  your m o o d  so that it is
intense, and you feel very happy and joyful, but it is not
uncontrollable. Adjust your mood so that it is intense, bu 
not out of control, so that you still feel in control but 
the ha p p y  m o o d  is intense. You may have to r a i s e  or l o w e r  
your mood to make it intense, but again not out of control. 
1 am going to ask you to feel intense and happy again. Try 
to keep the feelings just as they are now."
APPPENDIX G 
IMAGERY INSTRUCTIONS.
"As you continue to hold your mood, I want you to 
imagine what your future will be like one year from now. 
W h a t  you i m a g i n e  can be as r e a l i s t i c  or as u n l i k e l y  as you 
choose, but be sure to continue to hold your mood. In order 
to help you hold your mood, you may w i s h  to r e - i m a g i n e  the 
scene from the past that you used to help change your mood. 
For s o m e  of you it may be h e l p f u l  to s t r u c t u r e  your i m a g i n e d  
future scene around some object or event from the past 
scene. Others may prefer to imagine something completely 
different. Do whatever works best for you. holding your 
mood while imagining the future may be difficult, but it is 
i m p o r t a n t  that you do hold your m o o d  to the best of your 
ability. What you imagine does not have to be realistic, 
but it should take place about one year into the future.
Take a moment to make your mood intense by re-iraagining your 
past scene. How close your eyes and listen to my voice. 
"Continue to hold your sad (happy) mood.
I m i g h t  say s o m e  t h i n g s  that are not e x a c t l y  like w h a t  you 
are imagining, but that won't bother you or change your 
mood.
Let the sad (happy) feelings be intense.
Try to keep your feelings just as sad (happy) as they were 
earlier.
Now imagine a scene about one year into your future.
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Watch yourself enter the scene.
Look around you, what do you see?
Look closely, notice all the details.
Be aware of colors, textures, shapes.
As you continue to hold your mood, pay attention to sounds 
and sensations.
Feel any textures or touches.
Feel what your body is doing.
What is happening in the scene?
Are you a l o n e  or are there o t h e r s  w i t h  you?
Imagine the whole scene as clearly as you can.
"Now open your eyes. As you continue to maintain your 
mood, hold the future scene in your imagination as clearly 
as you can. W r i t e  d o w n  t w o  or t h r e e  short s e n t e n c e s  
describing what you are imagining in the space provided."
APPENDIX il 
MOOD ASSESSMENT SCALE
Carefully mark on the scale below now you feel right now. 
Continue to hold your mood at this level to the best of your 
ability.
the most sadness no sadness the most
you can imagine or happiness you can
(Reduced from original size for binding)
happiness
imagine
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APPENDIX I 
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCREENING
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Please answer the following questions. This information 
will be kept strictly confidential. DO HOT PUT YOUR HAHE OW 
THIS PAGE.
1) Are you presently receiving psychological counseling or 
any other psychological or psychiatric treatment?
Yes ___
Ho ___
2) Are you receiving medication for any psychological or 
psychiatric reason?
Yes ___
No ___
3) Have you ever been hospitalized for any psychological 
or psychiatric treatment?
Yes ____
Ho
S o m e  of you in this st u d y  wi l l  be a s k e d  to r e m e m b e r  
experiences from your life which have strong feelings 
a s s o c i a t e d . w i t h  them. If at any t i m e  you find th e s e  so 
unpleasant as to be unbearable, you may leave the 
experiment. Please see the experimenter on the way out.
READ THIS ONLY IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED ’Y E S ’ TO ANY OF THE ABOVE
If you have a n s w e r e d  yes to any of the a b o v e  q u e s t i o n s  
you may be excused from the experiment at this time. Just 
tell the e x p e r i m e n t e r  that you w i l l  be u n a b l e  to stay and 
th e r e  w i l l  be no q u e s t i o n s  asked. W e  w a n t  to th a n k  you for 
coming even if you are not able to participate.
APPENDIX J 
POST-EXPERIMENTAL HOOD ELEVATION'
Please close your eyes now and relax, I am going 
to help you to raise your mood back up. Lets go someplace 
in your world that is filled with fun and excitement. Maybe 
i t ’s some favorite place you have been, or some special 
experience you have had, or perhaps it's someplace you can 
cheerfully imagine. We'll wait 15 or 20 seconds until each 
of you finds a place for enjoyment.
Now that you have found some exciting, cheerful scene, 
look around you and see and imagine those things, people, 
thoughts, and experiences that could fill you with pleasant, 
joyful feelings. Keep looking, and allow yourself to 
experience the pleasure of these feelings as they begin to 
b u i l d .
What do you see as you look around you?
Look closely at the scene -- take in all the details.
What joyful or exciting things are happening?
Allow cheerful feelings to begin to grow within you?
Is there anyone there with you in your scene?
What are they doing that is helping you to feel excited, 
happy?
Is there something about them that makes you feel especially 
good?
As you continue to look arround you the cheerful feelings 
are growing.
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Let them grow stronger.
As I c o n t i n u e  to talk, you w i l l  find y o u r s e l f  f e e l i n g  m o r e  
and more joyful.
You can feel a slight tingling in your body.
Perhaps you are feeling light or excited.
Pay attention to those feelings and let them grow stronger. 
As you surrender to the pleasure of these feelings, the 
feelings will get stronger.
You feel happiness all through your body.
As you're there in that situation the happiness is becoming 
stronger a n d ■s t r o n g e r .
Your body feels light, but you might feel exicted, 
energetic.
You feel as if you're full of energy.
You feel as if you could do almost anything.
Let yourself feel happier and happier, more and more joyful. 
We will wait a short time as you continue to experience 
these good feelings. Let them reach whatever level is most 
comfortable for you.
APPENDIX K .
POST-EXPERIMENTAL RELAXATION 
Now, for th o s e  of you who are not c o m f o r t a b l e  w i t h  the 
m o o d  that you are in, I am go i n g  to do one m o r e  th i n g  to
help you to adjust your mood. You can change your mood if
you want to. If you like the mood you are in, just sit
back and relax. If you want to change your mood, close your
eyes and concetrate on my voice. Imagine someplace w h e r e  
you can feel peaceful and safe -- perhaps a quiet beach or a 
mountain lake. (Pause a few seconds.)
Someplace warm and friendly.
Look around you and imagine this pleasant place.
You may be th e r e  alone, or p e r h a p s  w i t h  f r i e n d s  or s p e c i a l  
p e o p l e .
P e r h a p s  the sun is shining, and your body is w a r m e d  and 
soothed by the sunshine.
Your worries and cares begin to shrink away.
You begin to feel relaxed, refreshed.
Look.around this special place —  experience and enjoy all 
the details.
Perhaps there are soothing sounds or pleasant scents.
Perhaps there is something interesting to watch.
You feel a warm, relaxed glow spread all through your body. 
You feel no tension or tiredness.
You breathe easily, deeply, slowly.
Perhaps you have a pleasant sensation of drowsiness or
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drifting.
Concentrate on all of these soothing experiences.
Let yourself drift or float through warm, peaceful feelings. 
All of your worries are far away and fading.
Soon you will be able to let whatever pleasant feelings you 
wish to experience spread through your body.
Feel the pleasant feelings beginning to grow.
Feel them spreading, getting stronger.
Your whole body is able to enjoy these pleasant feelings. 
Concentrate on these pleasant feelings as they fill your 
consciousness .
Let yourself experience them as much and as strongly as you 
want t o .
Take a few m i n u t e s  to enjoy these feelings, and let t h e m  
gr o w .
W h e n  you are ready, open your eyes and n o t i c e  ho w  r e f r e s h e d  
you f e e l .
Appendix L
Means, Standard Deviations, and Pisher's-Ratios for Future Change 
Questionnaire (PCQ) Scores and Total Change Score Transformed by Inage 
Clarity
Mood Group
Slated (n = 2*9) Dysphoric (n - 33) I)ys-Bl (n - 16)
Itea M SD M SD M SD F(2, 95)
1 66.52* 30.17 52*. 81 3i*.59 57.95 35.62* 1.37
2 78.1*0 27.79 73.63 25.65 37.6? 25 . 92* 1.10
3 S9.60a 18.82 78.21b 26. 11 9l*.i*la .16.1*1,o U.78*
V,
li 62*.92 29.65 53.82 2l*.i*6 58.59 30.2*7 1.56
S ; 68.91a 28.19 72.99b 32.2*6 92.11& ,28.17 3.72"
6  ̂ 85.85a 16.05 8l.32b 22.39 98.08d .16.11 2*.32*’
7 57.25 28.12 2*7.38 28.52 2*9.87 31.51 1.25
8 77.12* 31.89 81.37 27.98 91.2*8 25.20 1.1*2
9 85.1*9 19.02* 85.29 21.70 92*. 2*7 20.15 1.35
10 63.29 31.61 55.06 32*. 23 50.31 30.67 1.23
11 70.2*0 26.12* 71.51 3U.67 82.71 31.73 1.05
12 88.98a 15.95 76.6k
B
29.10 101.78a 16.2*1
*7.21
Total 896.8 170.0 833.0 226.3 959.2* 152*. 7 2.5?
Note. For any row, means with the sane subscript differ significantly from 
each other. Items 1 through 12 refer to PCQ items 1 through 12. Total * 
Total Change Score.
*£ .05
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Appendix M
Means, Standard Deviations, and Fisher1s-Ratios for Future Change 
Questionnaire (F©|) Scores and Total Change Score Transformed by Image 
Intensity
Elated J$- 1x9)
Mood Group 
Dysphorie (n ■ 33) Dys-El (n ■ 16)
Item M SD M SD M SD F(2, 95)
1 63.70 3©.3li 51.9U 33.20 56.57 31*. 32 1.37
2 7U.21 26.80 69.96 26.72 82.97 21*. 87 1.30
3 81*. 97 19.15 ?3.l5a 2l*. 1*9 93.71a 16.11 6.06*
1* 61.87 29.33 51.70 25.31 57.39 29.65 1.29
5 65.21A b26.81* 68.71*., 30.61* 89.00a>b 26.55 1*.39*
6 8l.U6a b16.81* 76.33b 21.53 95.058*v 16.27 5.56*
7 5U.61 28.02 i*2*.9l* 27.31 1*9.55 32.07 1.15
8 73.31* 31.77 76 . 824 27.51 38.1*1 23.26 1.61
9 81.32 26.1*3 80.51* 21.27 91.51 18.12* 1.79
10 59.67 36.06 52.31 32.16 1*9.39 30.1*8 0.91*
11 67.02 2§.19 67.72 33.32 79.93 29.63 1.25
12 8U.72a 17.97 72.65fi 26.39 98.98a 16.17 8.91**
Total 852.1 183.3 786.88 218.3 932.5a 155.0 3.21*
Note, For any row, means with the same subscript differ significantly from
each other. Itens°l through 12 refer to FCQ items 1 through 12. Total *
Total Change Seore.
*
E .05
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Appendix N. Univariate Correlation Coeffeeients for Future Change Questionnaire (FCQ) Scores and Related 
Data Calulated Using data From dysphoric and Elated Hood Groups
U* T o ta lItem 1 2 3 1* 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
2 .10
3 . .02 .09
it .51* .2 0 .17
5 - .0 7 .50 .20 .11
k~A W r f 1
6 .00 .12 q .62 H’lO M .21*’ M ro fV2 J-/ ro is* St?
7 .38 .12 - .0 1 .39 .07 .Oi*
8 - .0 5 ..5 2 .01 .06 .50 .07 .07
9 .1? .11* .1*7 .08 .13 .38 .01* .10
10 .1*7 .05 .2 0 .1*3 .10 .15 .55 - .0 3 .06
U - .1 0 .17 .11 - .0 2 .39 .07 .06 .21 .22 .01*
12 .08 - .0 6 .68 .06 .08 .51* .08 -.06 .1*8 .17 .23
13 .16 .Oil .hit .22 - .1 3 .26 .11 -.11* .09 .12 - .05 .1*1*
U* -.1 7 - .1 5 -.ou - .1 9 -.0 8 .07 - .2 0 .13 .10 -.21* .01 .07 .01*
T o ta l .ltit .53 .52 .51* .56 .1*8 .50 •1*1* .50 .55 .1*2 .1*8 .22
SD - .0 ? .11* .05 - .1 1 .19 .06 -.1 2 .17 .00 - .1 0 .16 .09 - .1 5
(fi
.13
.08 .08
N ote. Item s 1 through lit r e f e r  to  FCQ item s 1 through lit .  T o ta l  -  T o ta l Change Soore. 
SD ■ S o c ia l  D e s i r a b i l i ty  S co re .
Appendix 0. Univariate Correlation Coeffeeients for Future Change Questionnaire (FCQ) Scores and Related
Data Calculated Using Data from Dysphoric, dieted, and uys-El Mood Groups
Item 1 2 3 6 5 6 7 0 9 10 11 12 13 16 Total
2 •p.01
3 -.03 .20
6 .67 .lit .16
5 -.10 .50 .29 .06
6 -.01 .18 .63 .07 .36
7 •66 .06 .16 .61 -.01 -.02
8 -.07 .52 o • <
ZS .02yt .52M f .15\5 .01M r.i
tr rr"
M  fO ro
ca
9 .18 .21 .52 .08 .26 .66 .02 .21
10 .1*8 -.02 .11 .63 -.03 .02 .55 -.10 -.03
11 -.10 .20 .18 -.02 .67 .20 -.01 .30 .32 -.05
12 .03 .01 .66 .05 .22 .60 .03 .01 .69 .06 .30
13 .11 .05 .62 .18 -.07 .28 .07 -.11 .11 .08 -.03 .65
16 -.11 -.10 .01 -.21 -.02 .06 -.18 .18 .16 -.22 .06 .07 .06
Total .39 .52 .56 .69 .61 .56 .66 .67 .56 .62 .68 .52 .22 -.07
Su -.10 .15 .05 -.11 .16 .01 -.07 .17 -.02 -.09 .12 .05 -.16 -.06 .06
Note. Total ■ Total Change Score. SD ■ Social Desirability Score. Items 1 through 16 refer to FCQ 
items 1 through 16.
Appendix P
Suanary Table for Factorial Analysis of Variance Calculated Using Selected 
Data from Elated and Dysphoric Mood Groups
ouree MS df F
A 9188 1
:tui
2.66
B 6067 1
‘ 2> 2T C
1.76
AB 13382 1 3.88*
(Error) 31*50 56
J 766.1 3 "035
AJ 1116 3 1.36
BJ 9162 3
3
3.73
ABJ
(Error)
1*69.5
819.14
3
168
0.57
1
K 76913 2 26.89
AK 2651 2 0.93
BK 132.0 2 0.05
ABK 660.0 2 0.23
(Error) 2860 112
JK 21*81 6 3.51
AJK 823.7 6 1.17
BJK 282.1 6 O.liO
ABJK 676.0 6 0.96
(Error) 707.2 336
'15:
Si' :
Mote. A ■ Mood. 1 ” Sex of Subjects. J * Category. K • Change-Factor.
